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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, I investigate the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm 
performance, and how the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the board 
alters the busyness effect. Busy outside directors are over-stretched to provide 
adequate monitoring. Certified inside directors (CIDs), inside directors holding a 
directorship at an unaffiliated firm, have director labor market incentives to focus 
on their own firm’s performance and share firm-specific information to outside 
directors for effective monitoring. I find that the negative effect of outside directors’ 
busyness on firm performance is mitigated when a firm’s board includes a certified 
inside director (CID). This mitigating effect is more pronounced in firms where the 
costs of external monitoring and operational complexity are high. Director 
busyness has negative effects on both the level and the value of the cash holdings 
and the likelihood of earnings restatements, but these adverse busyness effects 
are mitigated by the presence of a certified inside director. The results are robust 
even after controlling for endogeneity with a wide variety of econometric 
techniques.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Multiple directorships are certification of directors’ expertise (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) and facilitate broadening directors’ social and business connections (Cashman, 
Gillan, and Whitby, 2010; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2012). However, directors who hold 
multiple directorships are often criticized for being too busy to provide adequate board 
service. In this study, I investigate whether certain board characteristics allow firms to 
benefit from the expertise and connections of busy directors without suffering from 
negative consequences of their busyness.    
 
The issue of the impact of director busyness on firm performance and firms’ 
responses to increases in their directors’ outside responsibilities has received 
considerable attention, both in the academic literature (e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and in the business press. A Wall Street 
Journal article published on Feb. 29, 2012 reported that the average time commitment 
required for a single board directorship has increased from 210 hours per year in 2006 to 
228 hours per year in 2011.1 Accordingly, some major institutional investors, such as 
Black-Rock Inc. and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, currently oppose 
the reelection of directors with more than four directorships.2 It has been argued that 
                                            
1 “Are Executives Overboarded”, Wall Street Journal, February 29, 2012, Byline: Joann S. Lublin 
2 “How Many Board Seats Make Sense”, Wall Street Journal, January, 2016, Byline: Joann S. Lublin 
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directors who are too busy (have too many directorships) may be less effective as 
corporate monitors and thus may negatively affect firm performance (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). Serving on multiple boards, however, can provide outside directors 
with valuable experience and reputational benefits. As better directors are more sought-
after, directors with multiple directorships may be, or may be perceived to be, of higher 
quality (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Evidence of the relation between firm performance and 
director busyness is mixed in the finance literature, but the view that busy directors are 
ineffective tends to get more support in practice. The 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index 
survey reports that 77% of S&P 500 firms now place some sort of restriction on holding 
multiple directorships.3 Several director and investor organizations also adopted 
resolutions recommending limits on multiple directorships (Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan, 
2013).4 Therefore, based on the view that busyness hinders effective board service, 
companies tend to forgo the possible benefits of having higher quality, but yet more busy 
directors on a board by limiting their directors’ external board positions.   
 
Outside directors play an important role in corporate governance to monitor 
management and to protect the shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The main challenge for outside directors serving on multiple boards is that they may be 
over-stretched and unable to play an effective role as monitors (Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006). Effective monitoring requires firm-specific information (Duchin, Matsusaka and 
                                            
3 Stuart Spencer US Board Index 2015, https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/ 
4 National Association of Corporate Directors, the Council of Institutional Investors, and Institutional 
Shareholder Services are among the director and investor organizations recommended various imitations 
with respect to multiple directorships. 
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Ozbas, 2010). Time-constraints resulting from multiple directorships may make the 
information acquisition task even more challenging for outside directors. Inside directors, 
on the other hand, possess more firm-specific knowledge (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
they are valuable in enhancing a board’s advisory and monitoring functions (Raheja, 
2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008). Because inside directors reap 
reputational benefits from improved firm performance, they have incentives to reveal 
information to the board (Raheja, 2005). By providing valuable firm-specific information, 
inside directors may lessen the effort required by outside directors to acquire information 
and thus may enable busy outside directors to provide adequate oversight. Therefore, 
inside directors may play an important role in enhancing the monitoring ability of outside 
directors, despite their busyness. 
 
Not all inside directors may have the incentives to reveal information to outside 
directors. Due to agency problems and dependence on the CEO for their career 
prospects, some inside directors may lack the incentives to take an effective monitoring 
and advisory role, and they may be reluctant to take a stance against an entrenched CEO 
in the boardroom (Helmich and Brown 1972; Helmich, 1974; Fee and Hadlock, 2004). 
However, inside directors who are not the CEO of the firm and who hold a directorship at 
an external firm as an outside director are a special kind of inside directors (Masulis and 
Mobbs, 2011). These non-CEO inside directors with external directorships have career 
and reputational incentives to be more focused on their own firm’s performance in order 
to maintain outside directorships. Due to the labor market certification incentives for the 
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inside directors holding external directorships, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) label these 
directors as “Certified inside directors (CID)”. With valuable firm-specific knowledge and 
less reliance on their own CEO for career advancement, non-CEO inside directors holding 
external directorships (here after, CIDs) can be a valuable source of inside information 
for outside directors.   
 
In this study, I investigate the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm 
performance, and how the presence of certified inside directors (CID) on the board alters 
the busyness effect. Extant literature provides evidence that outside directors’ busyness 
negatively affects firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and the presence of 
certified inside directors (CID) on a board has positive effect on firm performance (Masulis 
and Mobbs, 2011). Based on these two opposing effects, I examine whether the negative 
busyness effect of overstretched outside directors can be mitigated by the CID’s 
reputational incentives to enhance his or her own firm’s performance. In this analysis, I 
define outside directors as directors who are not employed by the firm or not linked with 
the firm or its affiliates (i.e., independent director). I measure the busyness of a director 
as the total number of directorships held by the director and classify a director as “busy” 
if he or she holds three or more directorships. If a majority of outside directors on a firm’s 
board are busy, I classify the board as a “Busy Board”. I define certified inside directors 
(CID) as the non-CEO executives who hold a directorship in their own firm as inside 
director as well as a directorship at an unaffiliated firm as outside director. I hypothesize 
that, by providing necessary firm-specific information, certified inside directors (CID) will 
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help reduce the time and commitment required from outside directors to perform effective 
board service. Therefore, the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the board 
will mitigate the negative consequences associated with outside directors’ busyness. 
Using the firm-fixed effect regression framework, similar to the framework of Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), I find that directors’ busyness negatively affects firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets) and the presence of CIDs on a board mitigates this 
negative effect. This result is robust even after I address the potential endogeneity issues. 
 
I hypothesize that the sharing of firm-specific information is the channel through 
which CIDs help busy outside directors provide adequate oversight of management. I test 
this hypothesis by examining the effect of CIDs in firms where the value of inside 
information is the expected to be higher. If sharing of inside information is the channel 
through which CIDs mitigate the negative busyness effect, I expect to see the most 
pronounced effect in firms where the value of inside information is high. Due to the 
inherent characteristics, some firms are more difficult to monitor than others are (Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). Moreover, organizational or 
operational complexity can make it difficult for outsiders to comprehend information about 
the firm. Such firms with high monitoring cost or high complexity are particularly 
challenging for overstretched busy outside directors to monitor. Therefore, the role of 
inside directors becomes crucial for the success of outside directors in high monitoring 
cost or highly complex firms (Raheja, 2005; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008).  Compared 
to low monitoring cost firms (low complexity firms), the impact of CIDs in mitigating the 
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negative effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance should be more 
pronounced in high monitoring cost firms (high complexity firms). To test this hypothesis, 
I examine the effect of the presence of CIDs in firms with a Busy Board in high and low 
monitoring cost environments. Similarly, I also examine the effect of the presence of CIDs 
in firms with a Busy Board in high and low complexity levels. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, I find that the mitigating effect of CIDs is more pronounced in firms that 
operate in a higher monitoring cost environment and that are organizationally or 
operationally complex.  
 
The Impact of the lack of adequate monitoring by Busy Boards should be most 
evident in decision areas where the boards have direct oversight or approval rights. 
Accordingly, I expect to see a more direct impact of CIDs on director busyness in several 
key action areas.  Determining the cash holding level and ensuring accuracy of financial 
statements are some of the important decision areas for the board of directors (Jensen, 
1986; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). Large cash holding without adequate oversight may 
lead the management to misuse the free cash flows for perks and empire building (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990). On the other hand, larger cash buildup minimizes 
missed investment opportunities and underinvestment (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stulz, 
1990).  Extant literature provides evidence that stronger corporate governance is 
associated with higher cash holdings and vice versa (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 
2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2004).  To the extent CIDs improve monitoring by 
the board, I expect to see a higher level of cash holding in the presence of a CID. I 
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examine whether Busy Boards maintain lower cash levels to cover monitoring 
deficiencies and whether the presence of CIDs on Busy Boards alters the cash holding 
levels. I find evidence supporting my hypothesis that, compared to Busy Boards without 
a CID, cash holdings are higher in Busy Boards with a CID. Since the market value of 
cash holdings better captures the magnitude of agency conflict, I also examine the impact 
of CIDs on Busy Boards with regards to the market value of cash as part of my robustness 
tests and find similar results.  
 
Ensuring the accuracy of financial statements is another key area of responsibility 
for the board of directors. Due to time and attention constraints, Busy Boards may lack 
an understanding of firm’s performance to assess the accuracy of the financial 
statements. Consistent with this view, Rowe and Shivadasan (2014) find that directors 
with multiple directorships are associated with higher levels of earnings management at 
their companies. However, since misreported earnings leads to a loss of reputation capital 
by directors and a subsequent loss of outside directorships (Srinivasan, 2005), certified 
inside directors (CID) will have greater incentives to ensure the accuracy of financial 
statements. I examine whether Busy Boards are more likely to experience earnings 
restatements and whether CID representation on Busy Boards reduces the likelihood of 
earnings restatements. I find evidence supporting my hypothesis that, compared to Busy 
Boards without a CID, the likelihood of misreported earnings is lower in Busy Boards with 
a CID.  
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Endogeneity is a common concern for all most studies in corporate governance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Accordingly, there is a concern for potential endogeneity 
in my study as well. I first discuss the potential endogeneity issues in the context of my 
study and then utilize a wide variety of approaches to address potential endogeneity 
issues. I have used firm, industry and year fixed effect in our main regression 
specification. Firm and industry fixed effects control for firm and industry level time-
invariant omitted variable biases (i.e., unobservable heterogeneity). Year fixed effects 
control for any inter-temporal changes in the economic environment that might affect both 
board structure and firm performance. In addition to a fixed effect regression framework, 
I have attempted to address endogeneity using lagged governance variables, two-stage 
least squares with instruments and GMM estimation. The use of lagged governance 
variables in regression of firm performance addresses reverse causality concerns. Two-
stage least squares methodology addresses omitted variable bias and simultaneity 
concerns. Finally, GMM estimation addresses omitted variable bias, simultaneity 
concerns as well dynamic endogeneity concerns. Overall, I find that the results are similar 
after my best attempts to control for endogeneity.  I recognize that any single econometric 
approach is not robust to all endogeneity concerns. Therefore, following extant literature, 
I have employed a wide range of econometric techniques to address endogeneity. Even 
with my multiple attempts to address endogeneity, I cannot entirely resolve all 
endogeneity concerns. However, I at least addressed the most obvious ones. 
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My findings are also robust to several alternate measures of directors’ busyness. I 
constructed alternate busyness measures based on relative prestige of the directorship 
(Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) and based on the average director time requirement for 
directorships.5 I have also tested and verified robustness of my results using alternate 
definitions of Busy Boards based on different thresholds of the fraction of busy directors 
on the board. To check whether the presence of a Non-CEO insider on the board 
mitigates the negative busyness effect, I re-estimated the regressions using an indicator 
for Non-CIDs (i.e. insider directors who are neither a certified inside director nor a CEO 
of the firm). I find that only the presence of a certified inside director mitigates the negative 
busyness effect. The mitigating impact of certified inside directors holds for both the pre-
SOX and post-SOX period. 
 
The existing literature focuses on the characteristics and effects of either outside 
directors or inside directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard (2003), Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013), and Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel 
(2014) are some examples of studies that examine the effects of director busyness on 
firm performance.  On the other hand, Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Harris 
and Raviv (2008), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) are in the strand of literature that 
present evidence examining the role of inside directors. This paper contributes to the 
literature by focusing on the tandem role of outside and inside directors.  I provide 
evidence that support the view that the cooperative role of inside and outside directors 
                                            
5 Based on the data from National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Public Company 
Governance Survey. 
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alters the opposite isolated effects of any particular group of directors. My findings provide 
insight about how firms may be able to benefit from the expertise and networks of busy 
directors by facilitating interaction between inside and outside directors.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
related literature and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the data and 
research methodology, and presents the descriptive statistics. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical tests and findings. Chapter 5 addresses endogeneity concerns and presents 
robustness tests. I conclude in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
        
  
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature related to directors’ busyness 
and the role of inside directors, place my study in the context of the related literature and 
develop key hypotheses 
 
2.1 Directors’ Busyness 
 
The effect of directors’ busyness on a firm’s performance is the subject of 
considerable debate. Outside directors are assigned the responsibility of monitoring the 
actions and performance of management as well as providing advice to management. 
Therefore, outside directors, rather than inside or gray directors, have duly become the 
center of attention in the literature related to directors’ busyness. The literature provides 
mixed evidence on the effect of busy outside directors on the performance outcomes of 
a firm. Some research argues that too many directorships may lower the effectiveness of 
outside directors as corporate monitors and advisors. However, other studies have 
yielded results that contradict this negative busyness effect. 
 
Directors’ busyness is commonly measured in terms of the number of directorships 
held by individual directors; and therefore, the holding of multiple directorships is used as 
the basis of the definition of directors’ busyness in the literature. The existing literature 
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provides evidence that holding multiple directorships certifies director quality. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that reputational concerns in the external directorship market 
motivate directors to demonstrate expertise in decision control by diligently monitoring 
management. Since the value of human capital in the external directorship market is 
directly related to a director’s decision-control expertise, directors with good reputations 
will be awarded with additional directorships.  
 
In support of this certification view of multiple directorships, some researchers 
argue that directors at firms that experience positive outcomes are awarded board seats 
in the future. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) show that retired CEOs who demonstrated 
better performance during their CEO tenure have a higher likelihood of getting more 
directorships. Coles and Hoi (2003) find that directors who support or enforce stricter 
corporate governance are awarded with a higher number of directorships in the following 
years. Bugeja, Rosa and Lee (2009) find that directors who were involved with successful 
takeovers are more likely to serve on additional outside boards going forward. Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) show that better performance at firms where a director 
sits has a positive influence on the number of board seats the director holds in future. 
They also find a positive announcement effect with the appointment of a busy director. 
On the other hand, directors at firms that experience negative outcomes lose board seats 
in the future. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that directors who were involved with firms 
that were subject to financial fraud lawsuits experienced a significant decline in the 
number of board seats they held. Gilson (1990) shows that the directors at firms that 
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experience financial distress will hold fewer board seats in the future. Similarly, 
Shivdasani (1993) and Harford (2003) provide evidence that directors who were involved 
with firms that became targets of hostile takeover attempts hold fewer board seats in the 
future. Del Guercio and Woidtke (2016) find that directors who cater to self-serving 
requests from special interest activists are punished in the director labor market with a 
loss in directorships. In sum, there is evidence in the literature consistent with the 
certification view that holding multiple directorships is a reflection of director quality.  
 
Holding multiple directorships can facilitate the broadening of a director’s social 
and business connections. Cashman, Gillan and Whitby (2010) find an association 
between a director’s connectedness with other boards and the number of directorships 
held by the director. Well-connected directors can be valuable resources for the firm, as 
they have better access to information about other firms and the condition of the market 
as a whole. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2012) suggest that the external connections of 
outside directors are a measure of those directors’ advising quality, and they find that the 
value of complex firms is more sensitive to the connectedness of the firm’s outside 
directors. They also suggest that the connectedness of a director can potentially add 
value to the firm through both information channels (i.e., better access to information 
about competitors, customer and suppliers) and non-information channels (i.e., exerting 
influence to obtain resources at lower cost). Larcker, So and Wang (2013) find that boards 
that are more centrally located within the network of corporate directors earn higher 
excess returns.  
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Better directors are more sought after and serve on a greater number of boards. 
However, taking on multiple directorships may also lead to “over-boarding”- the notion 
that directors holding too many directorships lack time to adequately monitor 
management. A strand of the literature supports the view that directors over-commit 
themselves by taking on multiple board seats and this results in negative consequences 
for the firm. Core, Holdhaisen and Larker (1999) find that when directors are busy, the 
CEO is able to extract additional compensation from the firm. They interpret this finding 
as a sign of weak governance, in the sense that busy directors may not effectively monitor 
management. Consistent with the busyness-induced lack of efficacy view, Beasley (1996) 
reports that firms where outside directors hold a higher average number of directorships 
are more likely to commit accounting fraud. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that 
CEOs tend to select directors who are less likely to monitor and directors who hold 
multiple board seats. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with a majority of busy 
outside directors experience worse performance. They also show that firms with Busy 
Boards are less likely to fire a CEO after poor performance, and announcements of the 
departure of a busy director at such firms are greeted with positive announcement returns. 
Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012) also find a negative association between board 
busyness and firm performance. Using a natural experiment with the increase in workload 
due to death of the CEO or other directors, Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014) provide 
evidence that directors’ busyness is detrimental to board monitoring quality. 
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However, there is another strand of the literature that provides evidence against 
the negative busyness effect. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) did not find 
evidence supporting the view that the presence of outside directors holding multiple board 
seats harms firm performance. Neither did they find any evidence that outside directors 
with multiple directorships are associated with greater likelihood of fraud litigation. Field, 
Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) find that busy directors contribute positively to new IPO 
firms, and these positive effects extend to all except the most established firms. They 
interpret the results as evidence that busy directors are beneficial for firms where the 
need for advising is higher. While busy directors may lack efficacy in monitoring, their 
experience and broader networks make them better advisors. 
 
Despite the debate over the effect of directors’ busyness on firm performance, the 
view that busy directors are ineffective tends to get more support in practice. Consistent 
with the perceived disadvantages of having busy directors on a board, several director 
and investor organizations have adopted resolutions recommending limits on the number 
of directorships held by directors of publicly traded companies. Resolutions adopted by 
the National Association of Corporate Directors in 1996, by the Council for Institutional 
Investors in 1999, and by the Institutional Shareholder Services in 2009 call for various 
limitations on holding multiple directorships. Consistent with these recommendations, as 
reported in the 2012 Spencer Stuart Board Index Survey, 74% of S&P 500 companies 
have placed limitations on the number of other corporate directorships board members 
may hold. In 2007, only 55% of S&P 500 companies had such limitations. These 
 16 
 
limitations are intended to ensure sufficient time and commitment from board members 
for effective board service, and thus support the negative busyness view.   
 
 
2.2 Role of Inside Directors 
 
 
There are contrasting views on the roles played by inside directors. Empirical 
literature on corporate finance provides evidence that influential CEOs select inside 
directors to maximize their own welfare and entrenchment. In addition to dependence on 
the CEO for selection to the board, Helmich and Brown (1972), Helmich (1974) and Fee 
and Hadlock (2004) report that inside directors depend on the CEO for their continued 
employment, compensation and private benefits derived from the firm. Thus, due to their 
own career concerns, inside directors do not take positions against an entrenched CEO, 
which results in weaker or ineffective monitoring and advising roles on the part of inside 
directors.  
 
In contrast, some researchers argue that inside directors enhance board 
effectiveness with their firm-specific knowledge and expertise. The implicit assumption in 
this view is that inside directors are selected based on optimality considerations rather 
than CEO entrenchment. Supporting this view, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that 
inside directors enhance the effectiveness of the board by improving the quality of 
decision-making. They argue that performance as a manager in their own firm affects 
directors’ value in the directorship labor market. Therefore, inside directors have an 
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incentive to focus on their own firm’s performance in order to enhance their human capital 
in the director labor market. Similarly, theoretical studies by Raheja (2005), Adams and 
Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) show that inside directors play an effective 
role in enhancing the advisory and monitoring functions of the board.   
 
Despite the theoretical studies explaining the role of inside directors, there is little 
empirical evidence on the effect of inside directors on the firm. The major empirical 
evidence on the role of inside directors comes from Masulis and Mobbs (2011). They 
argue that all inside directors are not the same, and that the labor market for external 
directorships provides a way to distinguish among the inside directors. Non-CEO inside 
directors with external directorships have reputational incentives to focus on their own 
firm’s performance, and this enhanced reputation also makes them less dependent on 
the CEO for their career prospects. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) named non-CEO inside 
directors with external directorships as externally certified inside directors (CIDs). They 
find that the presence of a CID on the board is associated with improved board decision-
making and better firm performance. Supporting the view that outside directorships alter 
the motivation of the inside directors, Mace (1986) reports that firm executives take 
outside directorships to signal their prestige and recognition in the labor market. Perry 
and Peyer (2005) suggest that outside directorships can enhance the reputation and 
prestige of an executive. They find that the outside directorships of an executive enhance 
the value of the sender firm (i.e., the firm where the executive is employed) when the 
sender firm has fewer agency problem concerns. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) suggest 
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that outside directorship enhances the visibility and connections of an executive and thus 
broadens future opportunities. They also find that an executive’s value in the director labor 
market is positively associated with own-firm performance. 
 
2.3 Interaction between Inside and Outside Directors 
 
 
An established view in the management literature is that inside and outside 
directors serve different but complementary roles on the board. Inside directors and 
outside directors offer different skill sets and outlooks on decision-making. It is important 
to consider how the role of inside directors can facilitate the efficiency of the role played 
by outside directors. Access to firm-specific information is essential for effective 
monitoring. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the information environment of a 
firm affects the outside director’s effectiveness in monitoring and advising. Jensen (1993) 
argues that a board of directors is ineffective because the culture of board operation 
discourages conflict, and also because the CEO determines the agenda and information 
given to the board. Since the main challenge for busy outside directors is that they are 
over-stretched, and it is difficult for them to invest sufficient time to gather the information 
required to perform a meaningful role, inside directors can play a complementary role by 
(a) reducing the time and commitment required for collecting information by outside 
directors and (b) assisting outside directors in comprehending firm-specific information. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a board must have the ability to use internal 
information, and that the presence of several insiders on the board facilitates the 
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information flow. Baysinger and Butler (1985) report that inside directors serve as 
facilitators or interpreters of information. Hill and Snell (1988) explain the role of inside 
directors as that of integrators of information on internal functions. Raheja (2005) and 
Harris and Raviv (2008) argue that the greater reputation of inside directors resulting from 
holding external directorships creates greater external job opportunities and reduces 
dependence on private benefits from their current employment, which increases the 
willingness of inside directors to share proprietary firm-specific information with outside 
directors. Thus, by providing easy access to information and interpreting firm-specific 
information, inside directors can save an already over-stretched busy outside director the 
time and effort needed to perform effective board service.   
 
The present study can be placed in the strand of literature that focuses on the 
interaction between inside and outside directors. The study examines the interaction 
between inside and outside directors, and how that interaction alters the effects of these 
two groups of directors on firm performance. In addition, this study sheds light on the 
channel of interaction between inside and outside directors and the environmental factors 
that impact their effectiveness. Finally, evidence is provided that a cooperative tandem 
role of inside and outside directors helps mitigate the negative effects of director busyness 
on firm performance. 
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2.4 Endogeneity in Corporate Governance Research 
 
 
Endogeneity is a major concern for empirical research on corporate governance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) summarized the endogenous nature of corporate 
governance with a system of equations:  
 
 
(1)   At+s = ϕCt + εt   
(2)   Pt+s = βAt + ηt 
(3)   Ct+s = μPt + ξt     
 
Where, 
A = Action of the Board (i.e., dismissal of the CEO) 
P = Firm Performance (i.e., return on assets) 
C = Board Structure or Board Characteristics (i.e., percentage of busy directors)  
 
Time is denoted by t (where s≥0). Φ, β and μ are equation parameters to be 
estimated. Residual errors for respective equations are denoted by ε, η, and ξ.    Equation 
(1) shows that board characteristics determine the actions of the board. Equation (2) 
denotes that the board’s actions, in turn, affect firm performance. Equation (3) reflects 
that firm performance influences the structure or composition of the board. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) further observed that most of the empirical studies in corporate 
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governance focus on directly studying the impact of board structure on firm performance. 
That is, these studies essentially substitute equation (1) into equation (2): 
 
(4)   Pt+s = β (ϕCt + εt) + ηt 
 
The problem with directly estimating equation (4) is that the relationship in equation 
(3) is not taken into consideration (i.e., reverse causality). Similar to many other studies 
in corporate governance, this study also focuses on estimating equation (4) to examine 
the impact of board structure on firm performance. Therefore, it is important that I address 
the potential endogeneity issues. 
 
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) pointed out that endogeneity problems in 
empirical corporate governance research that studies the relation between board 
structure and firm performance can be broadly categorized into the following sources of 
endogeneity: 
 
A. Unobservable heterogeneity: Unobserved heterogeneity can arise when both 
board structure and firm performance are jointly determined by an unobserved 
firm-specific factor. 
 
B. Simultaneity: Simultaneous endogeneity can arise when board structure is 
simultaneously determined with firm performance for a given period. In other 
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words, if firms choose a board structure in a given period with a particular level of 
performance target for that period, then (1) board structure will affect firm 
performance and at the same time (2) the performance target will also affect the 
selection of board structure.   
 
C. Dynamic Endogeneity: Dynamic endogeneity can arise when board structure is 
determined based on past performance. For example, if board structure is 
determined based on certain firm characteristics, and if these characteristics are 
related to past performance, then past performance will, in turn impact board 
structure. 
 
Unobservable heterogeneity or omitted variable bias can potentially be treated with 
fixed-effect regression. However, the use of fixed-effect regression depends on the strong 
assumption that the current board structure is independent of past performance. 
Simultaneous endogeneity can be treated using instrumental variables in a two-stage or 
three-stage least square regression framework. However, the strength of the empirical 
design will, to a large extent, will depend on the validity of the instruments. Wintoki, Linck 
and Netter (2012) show that a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator can be 
used to address dynamic endogeneity issues. They find that GMM estimators can be 
used as a single solution to address unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. 
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In the context of the impact of busyness on firm performance, extant literature 
discusses different possible sources of endogeneity and attempts to address the 
endogeneity with mainly econometric methodologies. Directors’ busyness and firm 
performance may be related to some omitted firm-specific variable such as company 
history, culture and product mix. Therefore, the regression of firm performance on 
busyness measures may result in biased estimates. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) address 
potential omitted variable bias by using fixed-effect regression.  
 
Directors’ busyness may also be related to past performance. For example, if 
poorly performing firms appoint well-connected and expert busy directors to the board as 
turnaround specialists, then we may see an association between poor performance and 
directors’ busyness. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Cashman, Gillan, and Jun (2012) 
use lagged values of busyness measures in their regression as robustness tests to 
account for this alternate explanation of the association between directors’ busyness and 
lower firm performance. Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) find a positive relation 
between directors’ busyness and firm performance for IPO firms. They investigate the 
possible endogeneity that highly reputed, busy directors may tend to join well performing, 
high-quality firms (i.e., rather than busy directors causing higher firm performance).  They 
use instrumental variables in a two-stage regression framework to address endogeneity.   
 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) suggest that a potential source of endogeneity in 
studying the association between busy directors or foreign directors and firm performance 
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is that busy directors or foreign directors may not be randomly distributed among firms. 
Rather, the presence of these directors in a firm may be determined by factors that affect 
the firm’s demand for such directors and the willingness of such directors to join the firm. 
For example, entrenched CEOs may prefer extracting greater private benefits that affect 
firm performance, and such CEOs may also prefer to hire busy directors for their 
inadequate monitoring ability. To address this possible source of endogeneity, Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2012) also use instrumental variables in a two-stage regression.  
 
Addressing endogeneity via a natural experiment in corporate governance studies 
is generally difficult. However, most recently, Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014) utilize 
a natural experiment to examine the impact of directors’ busyness. They use additional 
workload due to death of a CEO or a director in the firm as an exogenous shock to the 
director's work-loads. Also, but not in the context of studying impact of directors’ busyness 
on performance, several studies use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to address 
endogeneity concerns. A difference-in-difference approach identifies casual effects in 
panel data settings by studying the difference between a treatment group and a non-
treatment group based on sharp changes in the economic environment, government 
policy or institutional environment.  Using SOX as a regulatory shock, Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2014) use a difference-in-difference approach to address endogeneity relating 
to the effect of a co-opted board (i.e. board comprised of directors appointed after the 
CEO assumed office). 
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Except for omitted variable bias and selection bias, other sources of endogeneity 
are of less concern for empirically studying the impact of certified inside directors (CID) 
on firm performance. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) point out that CIDs are inside directors 
who hold directorships in unaffiliated firms. The directorship in unaffiliated firms is a 
market-determined decision. It is highly unlikely that a firm can decide when one of its 
inside directors will receive directorships in an unaffiliated firm and thus will become a 
CID. Similarly, it is unlikely that a firm would appoint one of its executives to the board as 
an inside director based on the executive’s possibility of receiving outside directorships 
at an unaffiliated firm in future. However, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) note that private 
information about an executive’s internal reputation can be revealed through the 
executive’s appointment as an inside director on the board. Selection bias could result if 
such private information has firm performance implications. Accordingly, Masulis and 
Mobbs (2011) utilize the Heckman selection bias correction procedure in their regression 
analysis. 
 
In the robustness test section of this study, I utilize (a) lagged values of governance 
measure, (b) two-stage regression with instrumental variables, and (c) GMM estimation 
with past performance as instruments to re-estimate my regressions to address possible 
endogeneity concerns. 
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2.5 Hypothesis Development 
 
My first hypothesis relates to the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) in 
mitigating the negative effect of outside directors’ busyness. The main challenge for 
outside directors serving on multiple boards is that they are too over-stretched to play an 
effective role as monitors. Effective monitoring requires firm-specific inside information. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the effectiveness of outside directors in 
monitoring and advising depends on the information environment of the firm. Similarly, 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that the effectiveness of a board improves as the CEO 
provides it with better information. Raheja (2005) highlights the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge from influential inside directors in enhancing a board’s monitoring and 
advisory effectiveness. The author argues that both inside and outside directors realize 
reputational benefits from better firm performance. Therefore, high-quality inside directors 
have incentives to reveal information to the board to improve board decision-making, and, 
eventually, firm performance. Therefore, with valuable firm-specific knowledge and less 
reliance on their own CEO for career advancement, certified inside directors (CIDs) are 
a valuable source of inside information for outside directors. The presence of certified 
inside directors (CIDs) lessens the effort required by outside directors to acquire 
information, and thus can enable busy outside directors to provide adequate oversight. 
The combination of the ease of information access for outside directors and the certified 
inside directors’  own reputational focus on firm performance can enable a firm with a 
Busy Board (i.e., where a majority of the outside directors are busy) to achieve improved 
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operating performance and higher valuation. Therefore, I propose the following key 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of certified inside directors helps busy outside 
directors provide adequate monitoring and thus mitigate the negative effect of busy 
outside directors. Therefore, in the presence of certified inside directors, firms with busy 
outside directors have better firm performance compared to firms with busy outside 
directors but without a certified inside director. 
 
I suggest that providing access to information to outside directors is the channel 
though which certified inside directors mitigate the negative busyness effect. The second 
and third hypotheses relate to this information channel narrative.  
 
The effectiveness of outside directors depends on the information environment of 
the firm. The easier it is to access and comprehend firm-specific inside information, the 
easier is the task of outside directors to provide adequate oversight. Duchin, Matsusaka 
and Ozbas (2010) argue that outside directors are most effective when the cost of 
acquiring information about the firm is low.  If outside directors are overstretched, they 
may find it even more difficult to invest adequate time and resources on information 
acquisition on the firm. Prior literature supports the view that monitoring cost is positively 
associated with investment opportunities. Coles, Daniel and Naveem (2008) and Linck, 
Netter and Yang (2008) argue that firms with more investment opportunities have higher 
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monitoring cost and, therefore, such firms are difficult for outside directors to effectively 
monitor. Consistent with this view, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that certified inside 
directors are more valuable in firms with higher R&D intensity, which serves as a proxy 
for investment opportunities. As certified inside directors (i.e., inside directors with outside 
directorships) have reputational incentives to enhance firm performance, they may work 
as a possible channel for outside directors to acquire firm-specific information. By sharing 
firm-specific knowledge and inside information, certified inside directors can make it 
possible for busy directors to provide effective monitoring. Inside directors are more 
valuable in firms with higher monitoring cost; however, it can be more challenging for busy 
directors to perform their monitoring tasks in such firms. Therefore, the beneficial effect 
of the co-existence of Busy Boards and certified inside directors should be more 
pronounced in firms where the cost of external monitoring is high. Based on the above 
discussion, I hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The mitigating effect of the presence of certified inside directors is 
more pronounced in high monitoring cost environments. Therefore, the positive impact of 
certified inside directors on Busy Boards is higher in firms that operate in high monitoring 
cost environments compared to those firms that operate in low monitoring cost 
environments. 
 
Similarly, the importance of insider information is critical for operationally and 
organizationally complex firms. Rajeha (2005) argues that the contribution of inside 
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directors is significant in complex firms because complexity of operations makes it difficult 
for outside directors to provide adequate oversight. Due to the cognitive resource 
limitation arising from over-boarding, comprehension of firm-specific information 
becomes difficult for busy directors. When the firm’s nature or scope of operation is 
inherently complex, I expect the negative busyness effect of Busy Boards to become 
more pronounced. As the role of insider directors becomes more critical in complex firms, 
the mitigating effect of CIDs on busyness should be more evident in high complexity firms 
than in low complexity firms.   Hence, I hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 3: The mitigating effect of the presence of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) on director busyness is more pronounced in firms with a high level of complexity 
compared to that in firms with a low level of complexity.   
 
The impact of the lack of monitoring by busy outside directors should be most 
evident in the areas where the board of directors has direct oversight. My third and fourth 
hypotheses relate to the determination of the level of cash holdings and the accuracy of 
financial statements, two of the areas over which the board has direct responsibility.  
 
In the absence of proper monitoring, higher cash reserves may allow managers to 
pursue unnecessary investments or perks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Boards that 
cannot effectively monitor management can set limits on the firm’s cash holdings to 
prevent use of cash for private benefits.  On the other hand, boards that exercise greater 
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oversight and have better knowledge of the firm’s operations can closely monitor to limit 
the misuse of funds. Such firms can allow a larger buildup of cash under management’s 
control to allow for rapid investment as profitable opportunities unexpectedly arise (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Busy outside directors are overstretched.  Due to their inherent time 
and attention constraints in monitoring, Busy Boards may set limits on a firm’s cash 
holdings to constrain management’s ability to use cash for private benefit. I find support 
for this view in Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), who provide evidence that weaker 
governance is associated with a lower level of cash holdings. However, CIDs may work 
as a counteracting force in this aspect. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that firms with a 
CID allow larger cash reserves under management’s control.  By providing inside 
knowledge on firm operations, CIDs can help to improve the monitoring abilities of a Busy 
Board. Thus, I expect that Busy Boards with a CID will hold larger cash reserves 
compared to Busy Boards without a CID.     
 
To the extent that CIDs improve board monitoring by providing inside knowledge 
on firm operations, I expect CIDs to be associated with greater cash reserves in Busy 
Boards compared to the Busy Boards without a CID.  Therefore, I hypothesize the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Due to the lack of adequate oversight by busy directors, Busy 
Boards are associated with lower cash holdings. CIDs help Busy Boards to enhance 
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monitoring effectiveness. Thus, Busy Boards with a CID allow for larger cash holdings 
compared to Busy Boards without a CID.  
 
Busyness can adversely affect a board’s ability to monitor management’s efforts 
to ensure accuracy of financial statements.  An informed director with good understanding 
of firm performance and operations is better equipped to detect inflated earnings. 
However, a busy director may lack the oversight for detecting efforts to misreport 
earnings.  Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) examine the effect of director busyness on 
recent IPO firms and found that IPO firms with Busy Boards are not more likely to restate 
earnings within three years of going public. However, for more mature firms, where the 
board’s monitoring role is more critical than its advising role, director busyness may have 
an adverse effect on the likelihood of earnings misreporting.  I find support for this view 
in Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014), who find that attention shocks induced by the 
additional workload of outside directors are associated with increased likelihood of 
earnings restatement. Beasley (1996) reports that a higher average number of 
directorships held by outside directors is positively associated with a higher probability of 
committing accounting fraud. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that CIDs are associated 
with a lower likelihood of earnings restatements. They suggest that, due to reputational 
concerns, CIDs have strong incentives to help outside directors in assessing the reliability 
of financial statements. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
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Hypothesis 5: Busy directors lack clear understanding of firm performance, and 
thus Busy Boards are associated with higher likelihood of earnings restatements. CIDs 
help busy directors to properly assess the accuracy of financial statements. Therefore, 
Busy Boards with a CID are associated with a lower likelihood of earnings restatement 
compared to Busy Boards without a CID. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
3.1 Data Sources 
 
 
The director-level data for my study comes from RiskMetrics and BoardEx. 
RiskMetrics (formerly, IRRC) covers director-level data for S&P 1500 firms starting in 
1996. This data has been extensively used in the literature for studying the impact of 
director busyness. I supplement the RiskMetrics data with director-level data from 
BoardEx, which provides information on the board characteristics and the directors’ 
networks. BoardEx coverage includes a wide range of company boards worldwide, both 
public and private. For the US, the dataset provides director-level data on 8250 US 
company boards starting from 1997. By combining RiskMetrics and BoardEx director 
datasets, I create a more extensive dataset of director-level information than those used 
in any of the previous studies on directors’ busyness.   
 
One of the major issues with the RiskMetrics dataset is that it lacks a unique firm 
identifier or director identifier across all years in the dataset. RiskMetrics changed its data 
collection methodology in 2007. The primary firm identifier for firm observations prior to 
2007 is a 6-digit header CUSIP, which identifies firms with the most recent CUSIP as of 
2006. However, firm observations on or after 2007 are identified with a 9-digit historical 
CUSIP, which identifies firms with an actual CUSIP used for each firm-year observation. 
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Similarly, completely separate director identifiers were used 1996-2006 (i.e., 
LEGACY_DIRECTOR_ID) and 2007-current (i.e., DIRECTOR_DETAIL_ID) time periods. 
Moreover, there are significant coding errors present in the director identifiers, which 
result in the same director being identified with multiple identifiers. To resolve the firm 
identifier and director identifier problems, I use the RiskMetrics data-adjustment 
procedures as described in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2014).6 In addition, I follow the 
sample construction procedure of Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012)7 to resolve 
inconsistencies in director identifier, gender, director classification, and director tenure. 
Even after making the adjustments described above, a significant number of coding errors 
remained in the director identifiers. For example, Apple’s former CEO Steven Jobs has 
LEGACY_DIRECTOR_ID 44467 and DIRECTOR_DETAIL_ID 7177 for different years 
from 1998 to 2010 for his directorships in Apple, Gap and Pixar. However, for his 
directorships in Walt Disney Company from 2008 to 2010, Mr. Jobs has no 
LEGACY_DIRECTOR_ID and DIRECTOR_DETAIL_ID 87560. By cross-referencing 
LEGACY_DIRECTOR_ID and DIRECTOR_DETAIL_ID, it is possible to identify Mr. Jobs’ 
directorships for Apple, Gap and Pixar. But this cross-referencing procedure will identify 
him as a different unique director for his directorships in Walt Disney. There are many 
such examples where the combination of LEGACY_DIRECTOR_ID and 
DIRECTOR_DETAIL_ID fails to uniquely identify a director for all his/her directorships 
during the sample period. I conduct an extensive manual verification process to uniquely 
                                            
6 I am grateful to Jeffrey Coles, Naveen Daniel and Lalitha Naveen for generously sharing their cleaned RiskMetrics 
unique director and firm identifier data with matching CRSP and COMPUSTAT firm-year identifiers.  
7 I would like to express my gratitude to George Cashman, Stuart Gillan and Chulhee Jun for sharing their SAS 
program codes that they used to resolve data inconsistencies in RiskMetrics’ director dataset. 
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identify the directors in the datasets. For the verification process, I check director profiles 
for all directors who have similar name and age, but different director id. Without the 
manual verification process of the RiskMetrics director identifiers, calculation of the 
directors’ busyness measures and identification of certified inside directors (CIDs) will 
essentially be erroneous.   
 
Similarly, for BoardEx data, I conduct an extensive manual verification process to 
ensure all directors are uniquely identified. Firm identification in BoardEx is primarily 
based on CIK Code, and it is consistent across the years. A large number of director 
observations contain director names with professional titles (i.e., Dr., Professor, Major 
General etc.), which is inconsistent with the naming convention used in RiskMetrics. 
RiskMetrics and BoardEx do not have any common director identifiers. I make the director 
name and age observations in BoardEx consistent with the RiskMetrics observations 
format to facilitate creation of unique director identifiers. I merge RiskMetrics and BoardEx 
director observations based on similarity of name and age and then conduct a manual 
verification process to create my own unique director identifiers for the combined dataset. 
 
I collect accounting data from COMPUSTAT and stock market data from CRSP. I 
supplement CEO identifiers in RiskMetrics and BoardEx with CEO identification data from 
Execucomp.  Earnings restatement data came from the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
Financial Restatement Database and I supplement it with data from Audit Analytics. Data 
on the average director time commitment per year was provided by the National 
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Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).8 I collect data on the Fama-French 48-
Industry classification from the website of Dr. Kenneth French.9 To construct an 
instrumental variable based on the number of public firms located within 100 miles of a 
company’s headquarters, I use the Zip code distance database of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER).10   
 
 
3.2 Sample Construction 
 
 The sample period for my study is 1997 to 2013. After resolving data 
inconsistencies and coding errors in the RiskMetrics and BoardEx datasets, I merge 
director-level observations from these two data sources. For the firm-years that are 
common to both RiskMetrics and BoardEx, I keep the observations from RiskMetrics. 
From the merged director data, I dropped observations for the firm-years that are not 
covered both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  I merge the combined RiskMetrics-BoardEx 
director data with COMPUSTAT and CRSP data using the COMPUSTAT-CRSP Merge 
(CCM) table provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Following Masulis 
and Mobbs (2011), I drop the firm-year observations with a co-CEO and the firm-year 
observation for which a CEO cannot be identified. I exclude financial and utility firms from 
the sample (SIC Code 4900-4999 and 6000-6999). After the above-described data 
                                            
8 I would like to thank Corey Albright, Research Analyst at the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) 
for providing assistance with collecting the director time commitment data. 
9 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
10 http://www.nber.org/data/zip-code-distance-database.html 
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screening procedure, I have 357,231 director-level observations form 43,705 firm-years 
and 5,747 unique firms in my final sample covering the period from 1997 to 2013. 
 
3.3 Busyness Measures 
 
 
The RiskMetrics database provides a count of directorships on major public 
boards. That is, the number of directorships measured in the RiskMetrics data is based 
on the number of directorships on major public boards. BoardEx includes, among others, 
a directorship count based on directorship in all public firms. To make the BoardEx 
directorship count consistent with that of the RiskMetrics data, I only count directorship in 
firms that are covered in both COMPUSTAT and CRSP for BoardEx firms. This roughly 
approximates RiskMetrics’ measure of directorships in major public firms. 
 
Consistent with the prior literature, I consider a director to be busy if he/she holds 
three or more directorships. Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012) experiment with alternative 
board seat thresholds for busyness definition (i.e., classifying directors as busy if they 
serve on two or more boards, or if they serve on four or more boards). They find that 
alternate board seat thresholds, in general, provide similar results with respect to 
association between directors’ busyness and firm performance. However, the results are 
strongest when directors are classified as busy using three or more board seat thresholds.  
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I use two busyness measures: (a) Busy Board Indicator and (b) Percentage of 
Busy Directors. Busy Board Indicator is an indicator variable which equals one when a 
majority (50% or more) of outside directors are busy, and zero otherwise. Percentage of 
Busy Directors measures the percentage of outside directors who are busy. These two 
measures capture the busyness of outside directors as a group. 
 
For robustness tests, I consider several alternate busyness measures. Firstly, I 
recreate the Busy Board Indicator based on several alternate thresholds. Specifically, I 
classify a board as busy when (a) 30% or more of the outside directors are busy and (b) 
40% or more of the outside directors are busy. Secondly, I create a director-focus 
measure based on the concept of a firm’s relative prestige from Masulis and Mobbs 
(2014). For each outside director, I construct a measure of directors’ focus in a firm based 
on the fraction of market capitalization of the firm in question in relation to the total market 
capitalization of the firms where the director holds directorships. Then, the average 
directors’ focus in a firm is calculated based on the average of directors’ focus by the 
outside directors of a firm. The smaller the average directors’ focus in a firm, the more 
distracted or busy are the outside directors of the firm. Thirdly, I calculate an alternate 
busyness measure by multiplying the number of board seats held by a director with the 
average director time commitment required for the specific year. Then, the average of this 
product for all outside directors of the firm provides a busyness measure that takes care 
of intertemporal changes in director time commitment requirement over time. 
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3.4 CEO Identification 
 
 
 
I follow the CEO identification process as described in Masulis and Mobbs (2011). 
Both the Risk-Metrics and the BoardEx data include a flag to indicate whether an inside 
director is the CEO of the firm. Using the CEO flag and the director’s primary role 
description, I identify the CEOs for the firm-years in my sample. In cases where CEO 
identification was not possible using the above information, and if an inside director was 
flagged as President or Chairman, or if there was only one inside director on the board, I 
identify that director as the CEO. I also supplement the CEO identification information 
from the EXECUCOMP database. If a CEO cannot be identified, or if there are multiple 
directors marked as the CEO (i.e., co-CEO firms), then those firm-years are also dropped 
from my sample. 
 
3.5 Certified Inside Director (CID) 
 
 
The concept of the certified inside director (CID) comes from Masulis and Mobbs 
(2011). Certified inside directors (CIDs) are defined as the non-CEO inside directors who 
hold outside directorships. I consider only independent outside directorships. Therefore, 
if an inside director holds a directorship in an affiliated firm, then that linked or gray 
directorship is not considered in deciding the classification of an inside director as a CID. 
This ensures that only market-determined directorships for inside directors are the basis 
for classification as certified inside director. To indicate the presence of a certified inside 
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director on a board, I use a CID Board Indicator variable which takes a value of one when 
at least one CID is present on the board, and zero otherwise. 
 
For robustness tests, I also use a non-CID measure. A director is classified as a 
non-CID for a firm if the director is a non-CEO inside director and does not hold any 
directorships in unaffiliated firms as independent director. 
 
 
3.6 Firm Performance Measures 
 
 
Assuming a high market-to-book ratio as an indicator for good management and 
performance, I use Tobin’s Q as the main measure of firm performance. I calculate 
Tobin’s Q as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book 
value of the firm’s assets and equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets.  
 
I also use return on assets (ROA) as an alternate measure of firm performance. 
Following Fich (2005), ROA is calculated as the sum of operating income before 
depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in 
current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the 
beginning and year-end book value of total assets. This measure captures the operating 
performance of the firm. Since the ROA measure is based on historical operating 
performance variables and does not contain any market price variables, it is not 
influenced by potential investment opportunities. 
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3.7 Control Variables 
 
I analyze my panel data sample using a regression framework with year, industry 
and firm fixed effects to examine the empirical association between directors’ busyness 
and firm performance and whether the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the 
board mitigates the busyness effect on firm performance.  
 
Performancei,t = β0+ β1Busynessi,t + β2CEODirectorshipi,t + β3IndustryDirectori,t + 
β4DirectorOwnershipi,t + β5BoardInterlocki,t + β6CEOOwnershipi,t + 
β7Boardsizei,t + β8BoardCompositioni,t + β9ROAi,t + β10FirmSizei,t + 
β11FirmAgei,t + β12GrowthOpportunityi,t + β13BusinessSegmentsi,t  +  
Firm Fixed effects t + Industry Fixed effects t + Year Fixed effects t          
 
Firm performance measure (Tobin’s Q or ROA) is used as dependent variable in 
my fixed-effect regression framework. Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006), I select a 
set of board and firm characteristics variables as control variables for my regression 
analysis. These board and firm characteristics variables control for the factors that are 
likely to affect firm performance. 
 
The board characteristics-related control variables are (1) directorships by the 
CEO, (2) ownership by the CEO, (3) ownership by the directors, (4) presence of an 
industry director, (5) board interlock, (6) board size, and (7) board composition. 
Directorships by the CEO (CEODirectorship) is calculated as the natural log of the 
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number of directorships held by the CEO. Ownership by the CEO (CEOOwnership) is 
measured as the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. Similarly, ownership 
by the directors (DirectorOwnership) is measured as the percentage of common shares 
held by all the directors of the board (excluding the CEO). The presence of an industry 
director (IndustryDirector) is an indicator variable that equals one if there exists at least 
one outside director on the board who holds at least 50% of his/her directorships in the 
same Fama-French 48 Industry Class, and zero otherwise.  Board interlock 
(BoardInterlock) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO sits on the board 
of any outside director of the firm, and zero otherwise. I measure board size (Boardsize) 
as the natural log of the number of total directors on the board. Board composition 
(BoardComposition) is measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board, and 
it is calculated as the number of outside directors scaled by the board size. 
 
Firm characteristics-related control variables are (1) return on assets, (2) firm size, 
(3) firm age, (4) growth opportunities, and (5) the number of business segments. Return 
on assets (ROA) is calculated as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus 
the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, 
and the decrease in other current assets. This sum is then scaled by the average of 
beginning and ending of year book value of total assets.  For regressions with return on 
assets as dependent variable, return on sales is used as control variable instead. Firm 
size (FirmSize) is measured as the natural log of net sales. Firm age (FirmAge) is 
calculated as the number of years since a firm was first included in the CRSP database. 
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Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that underinvestment or unexploited investment or 
growth opportunities may lead to higher values of Tobin’s Q. Following their approach, I 
include controls for growth opportunities (GrowthOpportunity) in my regression analysis. 
I use depreciation-to-sales ratio as the proxy for growth opportunities, and this ratio is 
calculated as depreciation expense scaled by net sales. Number of business segments 
(BusinessSegments) measures the number of business segments based on 
COMPUSTAT segments data. 
 
 
3.8 Monitoring Cost and Firm Complexity 
 
 
I hypothesize that certified inside directors (CIDs) facilitate outside directors’ 
monitoring ability by sharing firm-specific information, and thereby CIDs help minimize 
the lack of oversight by overstretched busy outside directors. This attenuating effect of 
CIDs should be more pronounced in high monitoring cost firms and high complexity firms. 
I test this hypothesis by creating two indicator variables for the level of external monitoring 
cost and the level of complexity of the firm.  
 
Following prior literature (Faleye, 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008), I select 
stock return volatility, R&D intensity, insider ownership, and the ratio of intangible assets 
to total assets as proxies for monitoring cost. As these are correlated proxies, I create a 
factor score from principal component analysis of these variables to construct a single 
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measure of monitoring cost. I classify a firm as a high (low) monitoring cost firm if the 
firm’s factor score for monitoring cost is in the top (bottom) quartile.  
 
Similarly, I draw from prior literature (Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; 
Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008) to select firm size, firm 
age, leverage and number of business segments as proxies for the operational complexity 
of the firm. I create a firm complexity measure using a factor score from principal-
component factor analysis of these proxies. I classify a firm as a high (low) level of 
complexity firm if the firm’s factor score for complexity is in the top (bottom) quartile. 
 
3.9 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
My study focuses on the interaction of outside directors’ busyness and the 
presence of CIDs on the board. In my sample, I have 2,744 firm-year observations that 
have a Busy Board (i.e., a majority of the outside directors sit on three or more boards). 
On the other hand, there are 2,620 firm-year observations that have a certified inside 
director (CID) on the board. Table 1 shows a matrix of Busy Board and CID Board 
classifications in my sample. 283 firm-year observations from 147 unique firms fall in the 
intersection of Busy Board and CID Board. A list of these 147 firms is provided in 
Appendix-A. Over the 17-year sampling period from 1997 to 2013, 6% of the firm-year 
observations have a Busy Board where a majority of outside directors hold two or more 
outside directorships (i.e., a total of three directorships including directorship in their own 
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firm). 94% of the firm-year observations do not feature a Busy Board. This indicates the 
general reluctance of firms to recruit busy outside directors.     
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of directors in the sample based on the number of 
total directorships held. 94% of the directors in the sample sit on two or fewer boards. I 
classify a director as busy when he or she holds two or more outside directorships (i.e., 
three or more total directorships). Based on my definition of busy directors, 6% of the 
directors in my sample are busy. The percentage of directors holding multiple 
directorships falls as the number of directorships increases. Less than 1% (i.e., 0.65%) 
of directors in my sample hold five or more directorships. The maximum number of 
directorship held by a director in the sample is 10.   
 
There is a decreasing trend in the number of busy outside directors in my sample 
over time. As shown in Table 3, 18.93% of the directors were busy in 1999. However, a 
sharp declining trend is evident during the post-SOX period. In 2013, only 10.96% of the 
outside directors were busy.     
 
Table 4 shows the yearly distribution of inside directors and certified inside 
directors (CIDs) over time. With the increased focus on board independence, the number 
of inside directors on boards has declined over time. There were 2,650 inside directors in 
the sample in 1999. This represents 23% of the director population for that year. The 
percentage of inside directors was more than 20% for every year prior to 2004. Since 
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then, there is a decreasing trend in the number of inside directors in the sample. In 2013, 
about 16.91% of the directors in the director population were inside directors. Consistent 
with this trend, the number of certified inside directors has also decreased over time. 
6.26% of the inside directors were CIDs in 1999. This number declined to 3.38% in 2013. 
However, since 2010, I observe a slight increasing trend over three consecutive years. 
 
Table 5 shows the decreasing trend in the number of Busy Boards and CID Boards 
in my sample. In practice, companies appear to believe in the negative effects of director 
busyness.  The 2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index survey reports that 77% of S&P 500 
firms now place some sort of restriction on holding multiple directorships. Several director 
and investor organizations have also adopted resolutions recommending limits on 
multiple directorships. This trend is reflected in my sample as well. In 1999, 9.38% of the 
firms had a Busy Board. This number decreased significantly over time. In 2013, only 
5.67% of the firms in the sample had a Busy Board. A similar trend is evident in the case 
of CID Boards. The number of inside directors who hold outside directorships has 
decreased over time. This may be a reflection of the increased time commitment required 
for a single board directorship, which has increased from 210 hours per year in 2006 to 
228 hours per year in 2011 (The Wall Street Journal, February 29, 2012). Distribution of 
Busy Board with a CID is shown in Table 6. There are a total of 283 firm-year observation 
from 147 unique forms that feature both a Busy Board and a CID Board. 
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In Table 7, I present descriptive statistics of the key variables of the firms in my 
sample. On average, 69% of the directors on the boards are outside directors and 13.5% 
of the outside directors are busy. On average, 6% of the firms have Busy Boards (i.e., 
where 50% or more of the outside directors are busy). 
 
In Tables 8, 9 and 10, I present descriptive statistics of different sub-groups of 
firms. In all cases, I examine the difference in means between the sub-groups. 
Significance levels of the test of means are marked with an asterisk where ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.  Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 present 
the descriptive statistics for the firms with a Busy Board and firms without a Busy Board, 
respectively. Firms with a Busy Board are larger in size, have better firm performance, 
bigger board size and a lower percentage of outside directors compared to the firms 
without a Busy Board. Firms without Busy Boards are more mature compared to firms 
with Busy Boards. This is consistent with Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013), who find 
that need for the monitoring role of outside directors is higher in matured firms, and thus 
they tend to avoid appointing busy directors. Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 present 
descriptive statistics of key variables for firms with a CID Board and firms without a CID 
Board. As defined earlier, a board is classified as a CID Board if at least one of the inside 
directors holds a directorship in an unaffiliated firm. Firms with a CID on the board have 
better firm performance, larger size, a bigger board, a lower percentage of outside 
directors and more busy directors compared to firms without a CID on the board. Firms 
with a CID on the board are also more mature and more complex, which is consistent 
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with Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) who suggest that need for firm-specific expertise 
from inside directors is critical in operationally complex firms. I further divide the sample 
firms into firms that have a Busy Board with at least one CID and firms that have a Busy 
Board without the presence of any CID. The descriptive statistics for these two groups of 
firms are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 10, respectively. Firms that have a 
Busy Board and at least one CID on the board are larger in size, more mature, more 
complex and have better operating margins, return on assets, a bigger board, more busy 
directors and a lower percentage of outside directors.   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Effect of Directors’ Busyness on Firm Performance 
 
 
In this section, I examine the effect of directors’ busyness on firm performance. 
There are several major studies that have looked at the same issue from different 
perspectives using different samples and methodologies. Previous studies mostly used 
samples comprised of S&P 1500 or equivalent firms for a shorter period of time. However, 
I use an extensive dataset by combining RiskMetrics and BoardEx director data that 
covers 43,705 firm-years and 5,747 unique firms for the 1997-2013 time period. By 
combining RiskMetrics and BoardEx director data, I study the busyness effect on a much 
larger sample comprised of firms from a broader range of size categories. Since the types 
of firms covered and the sampling period are much broader than any of the previous 
studies, it is important that I examine whether the previously documented association 
between directors’ busyness and firm performance holds for my study. Moreover, the 
focus of my study is to examine whether certified inside directors alter the directors’ 
busyness effect. Therefore, it is essential to document the exact nature of the directors’ 
busyness effect in my sample. 
 
The presence of omitted firm-specific attributes leads to biased estimates in OLS 
specification. The use of a fixed-effect regression approach is robust with respect to the 
presence of omitted variables, and thus results in more reliable estimates. Cashman, 
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Gillan and Jun (2012) find that use of a fixed-effect regression framework consistently 
provides evidence of a negative relation between directors’ busyness and firm 
performance regardless of the sample of firms examined. Accordingly, I use a fixed-effect 
regression to examine the directors’ busyness effect.  Following Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006), I examine the effect of directors’ busyness on firm performance using the following 
regression framework:  
 
Performancei,t = β0+ β1Busynessi,t + β2CEODirectorshipi,t + β3IndustryDirectori,t + 
β4DirectorOwnershipi,t + β5BoardInterlocki,t + β6CEOOwnershipi,t + 
β7Boardsizei,t + β8BoardCompositioni,t + β9ROAi,t + β10FirmSizei,t + 
β11FirmAgei,t + β12GrowthOpportunityi,t + β13BusinessSegmentsi,t   +  
Firm Fixed effects t + Industry Fixed effects t + Year Fixed effects t          
 
Based on the model stated in the above equation, I estimate fixed-effect regression 
of firm performance and outside directors’ busyness. Table 11 presents the output of the 
regression.  I use two different measures of firm performance: Tobin’s Q (models 1 and 
2) and ROA (models 3 and 4).  Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s 
equity plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and equity, divided 
by the book value of the firm’s assets. I calculate ROA as the sum of operating income 
before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the 
increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the 
average of the beginning and year-end book value of total assets. Outside directors’ 
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busyness is measured with the Busy Board Indicator and Percentage of Busy Directors 
variables. Busy Board Indicator is an indicator variable which equals one when a majority 
(50% or more) of outside directors are busy, and zero otherwise. Percentage of Busy 
Directors measures the percentage of outside directors who are busy. A director is 
considered busy if he/she holds three or more directorships. Following Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), I control for corporate governance and financial characteristics that 
are likely to affect firm performance. The control variables related to governance 
characteristics are directorships by the CEO, ownership by the CEO, ownership by the 
directors, presence of an industry director, board interlock, board size, and board 
composition. Control variables related to the firm’s financial characteristics are return on 
assets, firm size, firm age, growth opportunities, and the number of business segments.  
Definitions of the control variables are described in Section 3.8 and also in Appendix-A. 
Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-
values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level.  
 
Models 1 and 3 show that the coefficient on Busy Board Indicator is negative and 
statistically significant. Models 2 and 4 show that the coefficient on the percentage of 
outside directors who are busy directors is also negative and significant. That is, both of 
my busyness measures show significantly negative effects on firm performance 
measures in all models. The coefficients on the control variable are in line with the results 
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reported in Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012). Overall, the 
results suggest that outside directors’ busyness negatively affects firm performance. 
  
4.2 Mitigating Effect of a Certified Inside Director (CID) 
 
In this section, I focus on examining how the presence of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) on the board alters the busyness affect. Certified inside directors (CIDs) have 
incentives to reveal information to the board to improve board decision-making and 
improve firm performance (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). By providing firm-specific 
information and assistance in comprehending information, CIDs can lessen the time and 
effort required by outside directors to adequately monitor managerial actions. Therefore, 
I expect to see a mitigating impact of the CIDs on the outside directors’ negative busyness 
effect.  
 
Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), I define certified inside directors (CIDs) as 
non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships in an unaffiliated firm. I measure the 
presence of a CID with an indicator variable (CIDBoard) that takes a value of 1 if at least 
one CID is present on the board and zero otherwise. I examine the role of CIDs in 
mitigating the outside directors’ negative busyness effect using the interaction of the CID 
indicator and busyness measures.  Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for 
all regression models. The p-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level.   
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Table 12 reports the results of the fixed-effect regression. CID Board Indicator is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the firm has at least one CID on the board, and zero 
otherwise. I interact CID Board Indicator with Busy Board Indicator in Model 1 and Model 
3. I interact CID Board Indicator with the percentage of busy outside director measure in 
Model 2 and Model 4. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in Model 1 and Model 2 and 
ROA in Model 3 and Model 4.  I am interested in the coefficient of the interaction terms 
between CID Board Indicator and the busyness measure. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms are significantly positive in all models. This shows that for firms with a 
CID on the board, the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance is 
significantly positive. The absence of a negative effect of outside directors’ busyness on 
firm performance indicates a mitigating effect of CIDs. The coefficients of the busyness 
measure itself represent the effect of outside director busyness for firms without a CID on 
the board. The coefficients of Busy Board (in Model 1 and Model 3) and percentage of 
busy outside directors (in Model 2 and Model 4) are significantly negative. That is, for 
firms without a CID on the board, the busyness of outside directors negatively affects firm 
performance.  The sum of the coefficient of the busyness measure and the coefficient of 
the interaction term provide the total busyness effect. For all regression models, the total 
busyness effect in the presence of a CID is positive, and F-statistics for the total effect 
are significant at a 5% level. For example, the total busyness effect on the percentage of 
busy outside directors measure on Tobin’s Q (Model 2) is 0.034 (i.e., -0.041 + 0.075). 
The economic impact of the presence of a CID is nontrivial. Average market capitalization 
in my sample is $4490 million and average Tobin’s Q is 2.08. An increase of 0.034 in 
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Tobin’s Q is thus equivalent to $73.39 million increase in market capitalization for an 
average firm. The F-Statistic for the null hypothesis that the combined effect is zero is 
0.17, and the significance level of the test is 4.08%.   Overall, the results support 
Hypothesis 1 by providing evidence that firms with a CID on the board are immune to 
negative busyness effects, but firms without a CID continue to experience negative 
busyness effects on performance. 
 
4.3 Channel of Effect: Monitoring Cost and Complexity 
 
 
The empirical results in the previous section provided evidence that certified inside 
directors can help mitigate the negative firm performance effects associated with outside 
director busyness. I hypothesize that the flow of firm-specific information from inside 
directors to outside directors is the channel of this mitigating effect. In this section, I’ll 
empirically test this information narrative. If flow of information is the channel through 
which inside certified directors facilitate busy directors, then I should see the strongest 
mitigating effect in firms where it is particularly difficult for outside directors to acquire firm-
specific information. The cost of external monitoring and operational complexity of firms 
provides a suitable setup for empirically testing my hypothesis. 
4.3.1 Monitoring Cost 
 
One of the main challenges for overstretched outside directors is that they cannot 
invest adequate time and effort on a specific firm to monitor management. If a firm is more 
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difficult to monitor due to its inherent characteristics, then it becomes even more 
challenging for busy outside directors to provide adequate oversight. For example, firms 
with more growth opportunities or technology-intensive operations are more costly for 
outside directors to effectively monitor (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter 
and Yang, 2008). In these firms, the role of inside directors becomes more important. 
Raheja (2005) argues that the role of inside executive directors with firm-specific 
knowledge becomes more important in firms where it is more difficult for outside directors 
to monitor the firm’s projects or operations. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) argue that 
inside directors are more beneficial in firms with high R&D intensity where the importance 
of firm-specific knowledge for monitoring is higher. Similarly, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) 
find that certified inside directors (CIDs) are more valuable for firms with higher growth 
opportunities.  With greater labor market reputation and incentives, certified inside 
directors (CIDs) are particularly valuable for busy outside directors as a source of firm-
specific information.  CIDs can help to enhance busy outside directors’ monitoring ability 
by (a) reducing the time and commitment required for collecting information, and (b) 
assisting outside directors in comprehending firm-specific information. Therefore, the 
mitigating effect of the presence of CIDs should be higher in firms with Busy Boards that 
operate in high monitoring cost environments. To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect 
of co-existence of CIDs and Busy Boards on performance in firms with high and low levels 
of monitoring costs.  
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Stock return volatility, R&D intensity, proportion of inside ownership and the ratio 
of intangible assets to total assets have been used in the prior literature as proxies for 
monitoring cost (Faleye, 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008). To obtain a single measure 
of monitoring cost, I calculate a factor score from a principal-component analysis using 
all of these variables. I calculate the factor score for each proxy variable using the first 
principal component as it is the only one with an eigenvalue greater than one. For each 
firm-year observation, I compute a factor score, which is a linear combination of the 
standard normal values of the four proxy variables of monitoring cost. Then, based on the 
top and bottom quartiles of the factor scores, I create indicator variables for High 
Monitoring Cost and Low Monitoring Cost. The High (Low) monitoring cost indicator 
equals one if a firm is in the top (bottom) quartile of monitoring cost factor score, and zero 
otherwise. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) employ factor analysis to compute factor 
scores in a similar manner. They comment that using a single complexity factor score 
instead of multiple proxy variables “increases the power of the regression-based tests by 
circumventing difficulties arising from multi-collinearity.”  
 
To examine whether the strength of influence of certified inside directors (CIDs) on 
the directors’ busyness effect differs between high monitoring cost firms and low 
monitoring cost firms, I create two more indicator variables: busycid and busynocid. The 
indicator variable busycid equals one if the firm has both a Busy Board with the presence 
of a CID, and zero otherwise. The indicator variable busynocid equals one if the firm has 
a Busy Board but no CID is present on the board. These two indicator variables are then 
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interacted with the High and Low Monitoring Cost firm indicators to examine the mitigating 
effect of CIDs in different monitoring cost environments. Tobin’s Q is the dependent 
variables for all models.11 Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all 
regression models. The p-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level.    
 
In Model 1 in Table 13, I use the interaction of High and Low Monitoring cost firm 
indicators with Busy Board with CID (busycid). The coefficient on the Busy-CID and High 
Monitoring Cost interaction is 0.058, and it is significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient 
of the Busy-CID and Low Monitoring Cost interaction is 0.013, and it is significant at the 
5% level. The mitigating impact of certified inside director in a Busy Board is higher in 
high monitoring cost environments. Using a Wald test, I find that the impact of CID on 
Busy Board in high monitoring cost firms is significantly higher (at the 1% level) than that 
of in low monitoring cost firms. These results indicate that even though busy outside 
directors are less effective in high monitoring cost  environments, the presence of CIDs 
can overcome the busyness effect. This is consistent with Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2008), who find that inside directors are more effective in firms where the need for firm-
specific information is higher.   
 
In Model-2, I use the interaction of both High and Low Monitoring Cost firm 
indicators with both Busy Board with CID (busycid) and Busy Board without CID 
                                            
11 Results are similar when Return on assets (ROA) is used as the dependent variable. 
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(busynocid). The coefficients of the Busy-CID and High Monitoring Cost interaction is 
0.081 and it is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the Busy-CID interaction in 
Low Monitoring Cost is 0.033 and it is significant at the 5% level. As was the case in 
Model 1, I continue to find that there is significant difference between these two 
coefficients.  The coefficients of the Busy-NOCID and High Monitoring Cost interaction is 
-0.147 and it is significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of the Busy-NOCID and Low 
Monitoring Cost interaction is -0.126, but it is not statistically significant. The results 
suggest that in the absence of a certified inside director, directors’ busyness is particularly 
harmful for firm performance in high monitoring cost environments. Low monitoring cost 
(i.e., lower information asymmetry) works to the advantage of busy directors. The results 
provide support for Hypothesis 2 that the positive impact of certified inside directors on 
Busy Boards is higher in firms that operate in a high monitoring cost environment 
compared to those firms that operate in a low monitoring cost environment. This also 
suggests that the channel for the mitigating impact of CIDs is information flow to the 
outside directors. Therefore, the presence of a CID has a different impact on directors’ 
busyness depending on the information environment in a firm.     
 
4.3.2 Firm Complexity 
 
 
A firm’s level of complexity also presents an avenue to identify the channel of the 
attenuating effect of CIDs on director busyness. Acquiring firm-specific expertise to 
comprehend current business status and future business prospects in complex firms is 
relatively difficult for outside directors. As a result, the communication between the CEO 
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and the outsider directors is more costly in complex firms (Balsam, Puthenpurackal, and 
Upadhyay, 2016). Complexity of operation signifies the need for inside information in 
effective monitoring; thus outside directors face challenges in providing adequate 
oversight. Monitoring a complex firm becomes even more difficult for busy directors due 
to time constraints and cognitive resource limitations. Therefore, I expect the negative 
effect of director busyness to be more pronounced in complex firms. Masulis and Mobbs 
(2001) find that the positive impact of CID representation on firm performance is stronger 
in complex firms. Certified inside directors (CIDs) can be, therefore, be a valuable 
resource for outside directors to supply and decipher firm-specific information in complex 
firms. Since the significance of inside information is high in operationally complex firms, I 
expect to see the most pronounced mitigating effect of CIDs on director busyness in high 
complexity firms.  
 
Complexity of a firm can be measured on different dimensions. Extant literature 
(Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2008)  find scope of operations, firm size, firm age, and the need for use of 
external debt as some of the measures to capture a firm’s complexity. Accordingly, 
following the same procedure as with the factor score calculation for monitoring cost, I 
measure firm’s complexity with a principal component factor of firm size, firm age, 
leverage and number of business segments. Then I create indicator variables for high 
complexity and low complexity. The High (Low) Complexity indicator equals one if a firm 
is in the top (bottom) quartile of the complexity factor score, and zero otherwise.   
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I examine the effect of the presence or absence of certified inside directors (CIDs) 
on Busy Boards in high and low complexity firms. The indicator variable Busy Board with 
CID (busycid) equals one if a firm has a Busy Board with the presence of a CID, and zero 
otherwise. The indicator variable Busy Board without CID (busynocid) equals one if a firm 
has a Busy Board but no CID is present on the board. These two indicator variables are 
interacted with the High and Low Complexity firm indicators to examine the impact of 
CIDs in mitigating the negative busyness effect on firm performance in different 
complexity levels.  Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable for all models.12 Firm, industry and 
year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. The p-values are reported in 
parentheses and are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level.   
 
In Model 1 in Table 14, I use interaction of the High and Low Complexity firm 
indicator with Busy Board with a CID (busycid). The coefficient of the interaction of Busy 
Board with CID and High Complexity is 0.109 and it is significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient of the interaction of Busy Board with CID and Low Complexity is 0.096 and it 
is significant at the 1% level. That is, the mitigating impact of a certified inside director in 
a Busy Board is higher in high complexity firms. The Wald test shows that the impact of 
a CID on a Busy Board in highly complex firms is significantly higher (at the 1% level) 
than that of in low complexity firms. 
 
                                            
12 Results are similar when return on assets (ROA) as used as the firm performance measure. 
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In Model-2, I use the interaction of both high and low complexity firm indicators 
with both Busy Board with a CID (busycid) and Busy Board without a CID (busynocid) 
indicators.  The coefficients of the interaction with Busy-CID is 0.118 for high complexity 
and 0.098 for low complexity. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Using a 
Wald test, I find that there is significant difference between these two coefficients at the 
1% level.  The coefficients of the interaction with Busy-NOCID for High Complexity and 
Low Complexity respectively are -0.017 (significant at the 1% level) and -0.054 (significant 
at the 10% level). The results suggest that in the absence of a certified inside director, 
directors’ busyness is associated with negative firm performance for both high and low 
complexity firms. In sum, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3 that the mitigating 
effect of the presence of certified inside directors (CIDs) on director busyness is more 
pronounced in firms with a high level of complexity compared to that of in firms with a low 
level of complexity.   
 
 
4.4 Mitigating Effect: Cash Holdings and Restatements 
 
 
In this section, I examine two major firm actions where the board of directors has 
director oversight responsibilities: cash holdings and earnings restatements. I first 
examine how directors’ busyness affects decision-making in these two areas and how the 
presence of a certified inside director (CID) alters the busyness effect. 
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4.4.1 Effect of Directors’ Busyness and CIDs on Cash Holdings 
 
 
Boards of directors have decision power over the level of cash reserves under 
management’s control. The decision on how to utilize internal funds is at the center of the 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986). Larger cash 
reserves without adequate oversight may lead to unnecessary investments or 
consumption of perks by management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1990). 
Therefore, the board will limit managers’ access to free cash flow to mitigate agency 
conflicts (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). However, if effectively monitored, larger cash 
reserves can be a value enhancing provision because larger cash buildup minimizes 
missed investment opportunities and underinvestment (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stulz, 
1990).  Busy boards lack adequate monitoring, and thus I expect Busy Boards to be 
associated with lower cash holdings. Several working papers studying the relation 
between directors’ busyness and cash holdings (i.e., level of cash or value of cash) also 
support this view (Kim, 2015; Tarkovska, 2013). Extant literature studying the relation 
between corporate governance and corporate cash holdings in international settings 
provides evidence that greater shareholder rights are associated with lower cash holdings 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2004). CIDs, 
on the other hand, contribute to enhanced board monitoring; thus firms with CIDs maintain 
larger cash reserves (Masulis and Mobbs, 2011). To the extent that CIDs enhance 
monitoring ability of overstretched directors by supplying inside knowledge on a firm’s 
operations, I expect Busy Boards with a CID to be associated with larger cash reserves 
compared to Busy Boards without a CID.   
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I examine the impact of Busy Boards and CIDs on firm's cash holdings. The 
dependent variable in all models is cash and cash equivalents scaled by sales.13  
Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), I control 
for measures related to firm performance and governance mechanisms that are found to 
affect cash holdings. CEO duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the 
CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. I measured 
firm leverage as the ratio of total debt (short- and long-term debt) to assets. R&D intensity 
is measured as the ratio of R&D to total assets, and is used as proxy for financial distress 
costs. Capital expenditure intensity is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales, and is 
used as a proxy for managers’ attempt or willingness to increase firm size. Stock volatility 
is calculated as the standard deviation of the most recent three years of monthly stock 
returns from CRSP, and it serves as a proxy for business condition. Definitions of other 
control variables are same as described in earlier sections and in Appendix A (Variable 
Definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. 
The p-values are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. 
 
Results are reported in Table 15. In Model 1 and Model 2, I examine the 
association between Busy Boards and cash reserves. In Model 1, I use Busy Board 
Indicator as the board busyness measure. In Model 2, I use the percentage of busy 
outside directors to measure board busyness. In both cases, my busyness measures 
                                            
13 I find similar results using market value of cash as the measure of cash holdings. Results are provided in the 
robustness section of this paper.  
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show significant negative loadings. The results provide evidence supporting Hypothesis 
4 that Busy Boards are associated with lower cash holdings. Tarkovska (2013) also finds 
similar evidence that as board busyness increases beyond a certain threshold, it 
negatively affects cash holdings. Busy directors are overstretched and are time-
constrained to provide adequate monitoring. This lack of oversight mandates lower cash 
reserves to prevent the use of cash for private benefit by unmonitored managers. This 
finding of a negative association between Busy Board and cash level is consistent with 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) who find that firms with weaker governance are 
associated with lower cash holdings. In Model 4 and Model 5, I run a horserace between 
the counteracting effect of a Busy Board and CIDs on cash holdings using an interaction 
effect. My variable of interest is the interaction between CID Board and Busy Board 
variable in Model 4, and the interaction between CID Board and Percentage of Busy 
Outside Directors in Model 5. In both models, the interaction terms are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. It provides evidence supporting Hypothesis 4 that compared 
to the Busy Board firms without a CID, Busy Board firms with a CID are associated with 
larger cash holdings. 
 
4.4.2 Effect of Directors’ Busyness and CIDs on Earnings Restatement 
 
 
Ensuring accuracy of financial statements is one of the key responsibilities of the 
board of directors. However, due to time and attentional resource limitations, it becomes 
comparatively difficult for busy directors to attain a proper understanding of the firm’s 
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operation and performance. This may adversely impact directors’ ability to detect 
management’s efforts to inflate earnings. Consistent with this view, Masulis, Wang and 
Xie (2012) find that firms with foreign independent directors on their board are more likely 
to misreport earnings intentionally. They suggest that lax monitoring of management by 
these directors leads to earnings misreporting. Rowe and Shivadasan (2014) find that 
outside directors with seats on multiple boards are less committed to external monitoring, 
and that such directors are associated with more earnings management at their 
companies. Therefore, I hypothesize that busy directors are associated with a higher 
likelihood of earnings restatements in their firms.  Certified inside directors (CIDs), on the 
other hand, enhance board effectiveness, and this leads to less frequent earnings 
overstatements. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) suggest that CIDs have stronger reputational 
incentives to “ensure that outside directors are well informed and able to assess the 
reliability of financial statements and thereby avoid earnings restatements.”  Moreover, 
since misreported earnings is damaging to a director’s reputation and leads to 
subsequent loss of directorships (Srinivasan, 2005), certified inside directors (CIDs) will 
have greater incentive to ensure the accuracy of financial statements.  So I expect Busy 
Boards with a CID to be associated with a lower likelihood of earnings restatements 
compared to the Busy Boards without a CID.   
 
In this section, I examine whether busy directors in my sample are associated with 
a higher likelihood of earnings restatement and how the presence of a certified inside 
director (CID) alters this effect. I collect restatement announcement data from General 
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Accounting Office (GAO) studies that cover earnings restatement announcements from 
1997 to 2006. I supplement this data with restatement announcement data from Audit 
Analytics.  I exclude restatements for underreported earnings or restatements that 
improve earnings.  It is notable that the same earnings announcements may cover a 
period that affects multiple firm-years in my sample. In total, I have 5,114 firm-years with 
an incidence of restated earnings.  I estimate a probit model of the likelihood of a firm 
misreporting its earnings. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the firm misreported earnings for any quarter during the year, and zero 
otherwise. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), I include control for firm and governance 
characteristics that are likely to affect the likelihood of misreporting. The market-to-book 
ratio is calculated as the year-end book value of assets plus the market value of equity 
less book value of equity, standardized by book value of total assets. Operating cash flow 
is calculated as the annual cash flow from operations divided by beginning-of-year total 
assets. R&D Intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D to total assets. CEO Age is simply 
the age of the CEO. Post-SOX is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm-year 
observations are from fiscal year 2001 or later, and zero otherwise. The p-values are 
reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. 
 
In Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 16, I use the Busy Board Indicator and percentage 
of busy outside directors, respectively as measures of busyness.  I estimate the effect of 
board busyness on the likelihood of misreported earnings. The results show a positive 
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and significant effect of board busyness on the likelihood of earnings restatements. This 
indicates that outside directors’ busyness is associated with a higher likelihood of earning 
restatements. In Model 3 and Model 4, I interact the board busyness measures with the 
presence of a CID indicator. The significant negative loadings on the interaction terms 
provide evidence that Busy Boards with a CID are less likely to misreport earnings 
compared to Busy Boards without a CID. The results provide support for Hypothesis 5 
that in the presence of a CID, Busy Boards are less apt to experience earnings 
restatements.  
 
One caveat of the above finding is that the restatement sample used in the tests 
includes certain mandatory restatements caused by changes in accounting standards. 
Restatements in response to SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 (SAB 101) and 
Emerging Issues Task Force (ETIF) guidelines are example of such mandatory 
restatements. Following Peterson (2012), I was able to readily identify these restatements 
in the GAO restatement data. Therefore, to address the concern about mandatory 
restatements, I remove all revenue restatements in response to SAB 101 and ETIF during 
the sample period from the GAO accounting restatement dataset for the 1997 to 2006 
period. Then I performed the regression analysis using only the cleaned GAO sample. 
The results (not reported) are similar to my analysis conducted using the full sample. This 
is consistent with Peterson (2012), who reported similar results excluding or including 
mandatory restatements in GAO data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
5.1 Potential Endogeneity Issues 
 
 
I discussed endogeneity issues in corporate governance and how they apply in the 
context of my study. Following extant literature that has attempted to address the 
endogeneity concerns with econometric methodologies, I re-estimated several key 
regressions using (a) lagged values of governance measure, (b) two-stage regression 
with instrumental variables, and (c) GMM estimator. 
 
5.1.1 Lagged Values of Busyness and CID Measures 
 
 
Results presented in Table 11 and Table 12 suggest that busy directors are 
overstretched and ineffective in monitoring, which in turn results in lower firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q). However, by providing access to firm-specific information, certified inside 
directors (CID) enable busy outside directors to adequately monitor the management and, 
as a result, the presence of a CID on the board mitigates negative effects of director 
busyness. However, there may exist a possibility of reverse causality: firms with lower 
Tobin’s Q may appoint expert, busy directors to change their fortune. To explore the 
direction of the causality, I follow Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) to estimate the regression with lagged values of busyness and CID 
measures. The justification of this approach is that a firm’s choice of appointment of busy 
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directors in prior years could not have been caused by the firm’s performance in 
subsequent years. Therefore, use of lagged busyness and CID measures will allow me 
to mitigate the concern about reverse causation. 
 
Results are reported in Table 17. In Models 1 and 2, I examine the effect of 
busyness on firm performance, and in Models 3 and 4, I examine the mitigating effect of 
certified inside directors. The coefficient on the busyness measure is significantly 
negative in Model 1 and Model 2. The coefficient of the busyness and CID interaction 
term is significantly positive in Model 3 and Model 4. That is, I continue to find that outside 
directors’ busyness negatively affects firm performance and the presence of a CID 
mitigates the negative busyness effect.  
 
I have also re-estimated the regression using lagged values of other board 
characteristics variables along with lagged values of busyness and CID measures. I find 
similar results (not tabulated): a significantly negative effect of busyness on firm 
performance and a significantly positive mitigating effect of the presence of a CID.  
 
5.1.2 Two-Stage Least Squares with Instruments 
 
To address the concern that both the appointment of busy directors or certified 
inside directors and firm performance may be jointly determined by an unobserved firm-
specific factor, I follow the econometric approach of Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) 
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and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) to estimate busyness and CID effect regressions using 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. I employ firm, industry and year fixed effect 
regression framework in my main analysis to account for any time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity. Use of 2SLS complemented my fixed-effect regression analysis.  
 
I construct two instrumental variables: (a) the number of public companies 
headquartered within a 100 miles radius of the firm and (b) the number of outside directors 
who are over 60 years of age. To qualify as a proper instrument, these variables need to 
be correlated with endogenous regression (i.e., director busyness) but uncorrelated with 
the error term that may affect firm performance. The first instrument is developed 
following a closely-related approach employed in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) and 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2012). Directors may take on additional directorships in firms 
that are located within short commute. Therefore, a number of public companies located 
within 100-mile radius of the firm will affect the probability of taking additional directorships 
for both outside directors and the firm’s executives.  The second instrument is adopted 
from Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013), who argue that directors who are older and more 
likely to be retired will have fewer time constraints, and thus, may take on additional 
directorships. The Angrist-Pischke F-statistic calculated in first-stage regression (not 
tabulated) is 13.18, which indicates that both instrumental variables are significant in 
explaining director busyness. The p-value for Hansen J-statistics is 0.23, which indicate 
that the equations are well-specified (i.e., instruments are uncorrelated with the error term 
and thus correctly excluded from the second-stage regression).  
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Results of the second-stage regression are provided in Table 18. The results are 
similar to the results presented in Table 11 and Table 12. That is, directors’ busyness is 
negatively associated with firm performance, and the presence of a certified inside 
director (CID) mitigates the negative busyness effect. 
 
5.1.3 GMM Estimation 
 
 
If the appointment of busy directors and firm performance are jointly determined 
by an unobserved firm-specific variable (unobserved heterogeneity), and at the same time 
the appointment of busy directors is determined by past performance (simultaneous 
endogeneity), then our fixed-effect regression results will be biased.  Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter (2012) point out that researchers studying the relationship between board structure 
and firm performance can address unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneous endogeneity 
and dynamic endogeneity at the same time by employing GMM estimation. Proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), the GMM estimator is an estimation methodology of dynamic 
systems.   
 
In the context of this study, the GMM estimator will addresses dynamic 
endogeneity by allowing the current values of the busyness measures to be influenced 
by prior performance, past values of board busyness as well as past values of control 
variables.  It will also include firm-fixed effects. So use of external instruments will not be 
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necessary as they were in 2SLS. In the GMM regression framework, I use one period lag 
and two period lag of Tobin’s Q and all of the right-hand-side variables from our busyness-
performance regression as instruments. 
 
The results are reported in Table 19. My previous test results still hold: directors’ 
busyness continues to be negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, and the presence of a 
certified inside director continues to mitigate the negative busyness effect. 
 
 
5.2 Market Value of Cash Holdings 
 
 
Earlier, I examined the impact of directors’ busyness and the mitigating impact of 
CIDs on the cash holdings level of a firm. However, the level of cash holdings may not 
accurately capture the financial slack permitted by the board and the agency problem 
associated with a cash stockpile. Moreover, some firms may need to hold more than 
others due to the nature of their business operations. The market value of cash holdings 
is a better measure to assess the extent of the agency problems associated with cash 
holdings. Consistent with this view, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that shareholders 
assign a lower value to an additional dollar of cash when agency problems are likely to 
be greater at a firm. Therefore, I examine how director busyness affects the market value 
of cash and whether the presence of a certified inside director (CID) alters the busyness 
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effect on the market value of cash. Following Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) and 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007), I estimate the following regression: 
 
MarketCapitalizationi,t = β0 + β1Cashi,t*BusyCIDi,t + β2Cashi,t*BusyNoCIDi,t  + 
β3Cashi,t*NoBusyCIDi,t   + β4BusyCIDi,t  +  + β5BusyNoCIDi,t  + 
β6NoBusyCIDi,t  + β7Cashi,t + β8Earningsi,t + β9ΔEarningsi,t +  
β10ΔEaringsi,t+1 + β11ΔNetAssetsi,t + β12ΔNetAssetsi,t+1 + β13R&Di,t +  
β14ΔR&Di,t + β15ΔR&Di,t+1 + β16Interestsi,t + β17ΔInteresti,t + β18ΔInteresti,t+1   
+ β19Dividendsi,t + β20ΔDividendsi,t + β21ΔDividendsi,t+1 + 
β22ΔMarketCapitalizationi,t+1 + εi,t              
 
MarketCapitalization (market value of the firm) is calculated as the sum of the 
market value of equity and the book values of short-term debt and long-term debt. 
BusyCID is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm has a Busy Board 
with a CID, and zero otherwise. BusyNoCID is an indicator variable that takes a value of 
one if the firm has a Busy Board without a CID, and zero otherwise.  NoBusyCID is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm does not have a Busy Board but has 
a CID on the board, and zero otherwise. Cash denotes liquid asset holdings, and it is 
calculated as the sum of cash and marketable securities. Earnings is calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax 
credits. NetAssets, R&D, Interests and Dividends denote net assets, research and 
development expense, interest expense and common dividends paid, respectively. ΔXi,t  
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denotes change in the level of the variable X from t-1 to t. ΔXi,t+1 denotes change in the 
level of the variable X from t to t+1. All variables are standardized by dividing by the level 
of net assets.  
 
The regression is estimated using Fama-MacBeth methodology, in which cross-
sectional regressions are run for every year. The reported coefficients and standard errors 
are the average of the cross-sectional regression coefficients and standard errors.    In 
this regression framework, the coefficient of the interaction terms are a measure of the 
market value of a marginal dollar of cash for firm-specific board characteristics. I am 
interested in evaluating β1 and β2, which will show how the market value of a dollar differs 
when a certified inside director (CID) is present or absent on a Busy Board.     
 
The results are reported in Table 20. The coefficient of the Busy-CID & Cash 
Interaction term is 1.016, and it is significantly positive at a 1% level.  The coefficient of 
the Busy-NOCID & Cash Interaction term is -0.857, and it is significantly negative at a 1% 
level. The results provide evidence that directors’ busyness decreases the value of cash 
holdings, but this negative effect of busyness is mitigated when a CID is present on the 
board. A Busy Board with a CID increases the value of cash holdings. A Wald test 
comparing these two coefficients shows a significant difference. The results are 
consistent with the results I find with level of cash holding regressions. The results are 
also in line with the findings of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who find that the marginal 
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dollar of cash in firms with poor governance is valued between $0.42 and $0.88, whereas 
the marginal dollar of cash in firms with good governance is as much as $1.62.  
 
 
5.3 Effect of Non-CIDs  
 
 
My results support the hypothesis that certified inside directors (CIDs) mitigates 
the negative busyness effect. In this section I investigate whether non-CIDs have a similar 
mitigating effect. Non-CIDs are company executives who sit on the company board, but 
do not hold any outside directorships in unaffiliated firms.  
 
The results are presented in Table 21. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between non-CID and busyness measures is negative, but statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that the presence of non-CIDs is not associated with any mitigating effect. This 
finding is consistent with Masulis and Mobbs (2011), who find that non-CIDs are not 
associated with improved firm performance and in some cases non-CIDs show firm-
performance-distracting characteristics. They suggest that non-CIDs are selected on the 
board for their interest-alignment with the CEO, rather than for their likely contributions to 
effective board decision-making. Overall, my results suggest that among the inside 
directors, board-enhancing characteristics are limited to certified inside directors (CIDs) 
only. 
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5.4 Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
 
The implementation of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during our 
sample period has affected different aspects of corporate governance, including liability 
of outside directors and the proportion of inside directors on boards (Linck, Netter and 
Yang, 2009). This may alter the directors’ busyness effect and the extent to which CIDs 
alter this effect. To investigate the impact of SOX on our study, I re-estimate the directors’ 
busyness effect and CIDs’ mitigating effect regressions for both pre-SOX and post-SOX 
periods. Following Masulis and Mobbs (2011), I define post-SOX period observations as 
the firm-year observations occurring in fiscal year 2001 or later.  
 
The results are reported in Table 22 (Pre-SOX) and Table 23 (Post-SOX). The 
results indicate that the negative busyness effect on firm performance and the mitigating 
effect of CIDs similarly hold for both pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. This is consistent 
with Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013), who find no significant impact of SOX on the 
directors’ busyness effect. However, the magnitude of the coefficients of the busyness 
measure becomes weaker (i.e., less negative) in the post-SOX period, and the magnitude 
of the coefficients of the busyness-CID interaction term becomes stronger (i.e., more 
positive) in the post-SOX period. For instance, the coefficient of busyness measures 
during the pre-SOX period are -0.055 and -0.074, both of which are significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of the same busyness measures for the post-SOX period diminishes 
in its negativity to -0.032 and -0.31, both of which are significant at the 1% level. That is, 
the magnitude of the negative effect diminished in the post-SOX period. This may be a 
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result of increased director responsibility (Linck, Netter and Yang, 2009) arising from the 
enactment of SOX, which, in turn, may have motivated directors to monitor more 
diligently. Similarly, the coefficient of the busyness and CID interaction terms for the pre-
SOX period are 0.106 and 0.075, both of which are significant at the 1% level. These 
coefficients increased in magnitude to 0.110 and 0.091 during the post-SOX period. That 
is, the magnitude of the mitigating effect of certified inside directors (CID) has become 
stronger in the post-SOX period. This is consistent with Masulis and Mobbs (2011), who 
explain that firms face increased pressure to reduce inside directors during the post-SOX 
period, and thus, the smaller pool of inside directors is gaining greater labor market 
visibility.   This greater visibility gives stronger incentives to a certified inside director (CID) 
to participate actively on the board decision-making. A test (i.e., seemingly unrelated 
estimation in STATA) for comparison of the coefficients reveals that there are significant 
differences between the respective coefficients in pre-SOX and post-SOX regressions for 
both the busyness measure and busyness-CID interaction. 
 
It is important to note that the BoardEx data coverage includes 1500 to 1900 firms 
till year 2002 and these firms roughly correspond to the S&P 1500 firms. In year 2003, 
BoardEx coverage was expanded to include Russell 3000 firms that brought many 
smaller firms under BoardEx coverage. This essentially creates a sample selection bias. 
However, the BoardEx expansion period closely corresponds to the SOX enactment 
period. Therefore, the tests that I conduct in this section by splitting the sample into pre-
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SOX and post-SOX period also address the selection bias concern for BoardEx data 
expansion. 
5.5 Alternate Busyness Measures 
 
I have used two busyness measures in my main analysis: Busy Board and 
Percentage of Busy Outside Directors. A director is defined as busy if he/she sits on three 
or more boards. Percentage of busy directors is a continuous measure and is calculated 
as the fraction of outside directors who are busy. Busy Board is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one if the percentage of busy directors on a board is 50% or higher, and 
zero otherwise.  The three-directorship criterion for defining busyness has been 
extensively used in the literature (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard, 2003). It also reflects the recommendations from investor organizations (i.e., 
Council of Institutional Investors), who recommend that directors should sit on no more 
than two boards. Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012) experiment with different thresholds 
for defining busyness, and find that a three-directorship based definition provides the 
most consistent results. They also define busyness by using (a) different thresholds for 
directors who are retired, and (b) different thresholds depending on firm complexity. They 
find the three-directorship definition to be “as informative as the more complex data-
intensive proxies”. In this section, I focus on defining busyness based on directors’ focus, 
average time requirement per directorship, and different thresholds for defining the Busy 
Board Indicator. 
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5.5.1 Directors’ Focus 
 
Masulis and Mobbs (2011) find that directors with multiple directorships distribute 
their effort unequally based on the directorships' relative prestige. Relative prestige of the 
firm affects the reputation incentives in the director labor market. Accordingly, time-
constrained directors holding multiple directorships prioritize among their directorships 
and put more effort into the directorships of more prestigious firms. Based on this finding, 
I develop an alternate measure of busyness that takes into account the amount of focus 
the director puts into the directorship. For each director, I compute the total market 
capitalization of the firms where a director holds directorships. Then, I assign a director’s 
focus in a particular firm based on the fraction of the market capital of the firm relative to 
the total market capitalization of the firms in the director’s directorship portfolio. This 
results in a director focus value for every director observation in my dataset. Finally, I 
compute the average director focus value in a firm based on the average director focus 
of all outside directors in the firm. I use this average director focus value as the busyness 
measure. A lower value of the average director focus implies that the outside directors of 
the firm are less focused on the company. We expect a positive relation between director 
focus and firm performance.  
 
The director focus calculation process is illustrated with the following example: Mr. 
Vernon Jordan held directorships on the boards of four companies in fiscal year 2005. 
These companies are Sara Lee Corp., JC Penny Co. Inc., Dow Jones & Co. Inc., and 
Xerox Corp. The total market capitalization of these companies in 2005 was 
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$45,589,335,856. The market capitalization of Xerox Corp. was 14,069,888,934. The 
director focus of Mr. Vernon Jordan on Xerox Corp. is 30.86%. Following this procedure, 
I calculate director focus for all outside directors of Xerox Corp. in 2005 and then compute 
the average. This number provides the average director focus of all outside directors in 
the firm in a particular year. For example, the average director focus of Xerox Corp. in 
2005 was 75.54%. 
 
I re-estimated my regressions using average director focus as the busyness 
measure. The results are reported in Models 1 and 2 in Table 24. The coefficient of 
director focus is positive and significant at the 1% level.  The presence of CID on the 
board enhances the positive impact of director focus on firm performance. The results are 
consistent with the earlier results: director focus (i.e., not busy) is associated with positive 
firm performance, and the presence of a CID enhances board effectiveness. 
 
5.5.2 Directors’ Required Time Commitment 
 
 
Busyness measures based on number of directorships does not take the inter-
temporal change in required time commitment into consideration. The average time 
commitment required for a single board directorship has increased from 207.4 hours per 
year in 2007 to 242.1 hours per year in 2014.  A director who held three directorships in 
2014 spent 104 hours more on average compared to a director holding same number of 
directorships in 2007. To address this concern, I create a busyness measure of total time 
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commitment by multiplying the number of directorships by the average director time 
commitment required for a particular year based on the director time commitment data 
provided by National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). For each firm-year, I 
calculate the average time commitment of all the outside directors and use this as a 
busyness measure in my regression analysis. 
 
The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) reports that the average 
time commitment required for each directorship has been increasing over the years. 
NACD provided me with data on the director time commitment for 2007-2014 time period. 
I have extended the time period back to 2002 with various online sources that reported 
director time commitment statistics with NACD reference.  Average required director time 
commitment data by years are provided in Appendix-B. The methodology used by NACD 
for calculating director time commitment differs among years prior 2008. However, since 
2008, the average director time commitment is calculated using director time spent on (a) 
board and committee meetings, (b) informal meetings or conversations with 
management14 (c) reviewing reports and other materials, (d) traveling to/from board 
events, (e) director education, (f) representing the company at public events, and (g) 
others (e.g., board social events).   
 
The results are reported in Models 3 and 4 in Table 24. The results are similar to 
my earlier analysis. I also test the impact of busyness by defining a director as busy when 
                                            
14 NACD started collecting data on informal meetings or conversations with management in 2014. 
 82 
 
his/her time commitment is above the median time commitment for the directors in a 
particular year. The results (not tabulated) remain the same with this busyness definition. 
 
5.5.3 Different Threshold for Busy Board Definition 
 
 
In earlier sections of this study, I defined Busy Board as an indicator variable that 
equals one if 50% or more of the outside directors are busy. As a robustness test, I 
examine how changing the definition of Busy Board with different percentages of busy 
director thresholds impact the relation between busy directors and firm performance. I 
define a board as a Busy Board when (a) 30% of outside directors are busy, (b) 35% of 
outside directors are busy, (c) 40% of outside directors are busy, and (d) 45% of outside 
directors are busy. The effect of directors’ busyness on firm performance is statistically 
insignificant for 30%, 35%, and 40% thresholds. This is consistent with Cashman, Gillan 
and Jun (2012) who find that the impact of busy directors on firm performance loses 
statistical significance when the threshold for busyness dentition is relaxed or broadened. 
The results (not tabulated) are similar for Busy Board definitions with thresholds of 
45% and 50%. With my current Busy Board dentition with a 50% threshold, I have 2,744 
Busy Boards and 283 Busy Boards with a CID. If I use a 45% threshold, the number of 
Busy Boards and the number of Busy Boards with a CID in my sample increases slightly 
to 2,789 and 290, respectively. 
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Overall, I find that my results are robust to alternate busyness definitions. This is 
consistent with an observation in Cashman, Gillan and Jun (2012). They comment that 
“future researchers can avoid the data collection and cleaning associated with the 
busyness measures we examine and focus on the relatively straightforward proxy used 
in the prior literature.”  
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION 
 
The academic literature provides evidence that multiple directorships represent a 
certification of quality. Therefore, it should be beneficial to have busy outside directors on 
a board. There is also evidence in the literature that busy directors are over-stretched in 
time and commitment and thus, they are ineffective monitors of management. 
Accordingly, the presence of busy directors on a board is associated with worse firm 
performance. Even though some evidence refutes this negative busyness effect, in 
practice, firms seem to believe in the critical view of multiple directorships. More than 77% 
of firms currently have various forms of restrictions on holding multiple directorships. 
Although Busy Boards, composed mostly of busy outside directors, are negatively 
associated with firm performance, recent literature provides evidence that the presence 
of certified inside directors (i.e., non-CEO inside directors with directorships in unaffiliated 
firms) on board is associated with a positive effect on firm performance. The reputational 
incentives of the director labor market act as a driving factor for the Certified inside 
directors (CIDs) to collaborate with outside directors in enhancing firm performance. In 
this paper, I investigated whether the presence on the board of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) can mitigate the negative effect of outside directors’ busyness. 
 
Using a sample of 43,705 firm-years from the Risk Metrics and BoardEx Dataset, 
I found evidence that the busyness of outside directors is negatively associated with firm 
performance. However, the reputational incentives of non-CEO inside directors with 
 85 
 
outside directors (CIDs) help mitigate the deficiencies of the overstretched busy outside 
directors of the firm. The results show that when one or more CIDs are present on the 
board, the negative association between an outside director’s busyness and firm 
performance ceases. However, firms that feature a Busy Board without the presence of 
a CID continue to experience a negative busyness effect on firm performance. This result 
is robust after I address the potential endogeneity issues. 
 
CIDs can help busy outside directors to provide adequate oversight of 
management by facilitating access to firm-specific information and by helping form a 
better comprehension of the information. Therefore, the impact of the presence of CIDs 
in mitigating the negative effects of outside directors’ busyness should be more 
pronounced in high monitoring cost and high complexity firms, where firm-specific 
information is essential for effective monitoring. To test this hypothesis, I examined the 
role of CIDs in mitigating negative busyness effects in high and low monitoring cost 
environment firms, as well as high and low complexity firms. I find that the presence of a 
CID in a firm with a Busy Board is more beneficial in firms that operate in a high monitoring 
cost environment and that have a high level of organizational/operational complexity.  
 
I also examined two key decision areas where the board has direct oversight or 
approval rights: the determination of the cash holdings level and ensuring the accuracy 
of financial statements. The lack of adequate monitoring by a Busy Board will be most 
evident and the impact of CIDs on director busyness will be more direct in those key 
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action areas. Firms that lack adequate oversight tend to maintain a lower cash holding to 
prevent unmonitored management from consuming perks and overinvesting. I find that 
Busy Boards maintain lower cash levels to cover their monitoring deficiencies, and the 
presence of CIDs on Busy Boards alters the cash holding levels. Due to time and attention 
constraints, Busy Boards may lack the understanding of the firms’ performance, which is 
essential for assessing the accuracy of financial statements, and thereby reducing the 
likelihood of misreported earnings. I find that Busy Boards are more likely to experience 
earning restatements, and CID representation on Busy Boards mitigates this effect.  
 
The existing literature provides evidence on the isolated effects of outside 
director’s busyness or inside director’s certification incentives. Focusing on the interaction 
between inside and outside directors, I provide evidence that support the view that a 
cooperative tandem role between inside and outside directors may help mitigating the 
negative effects director busyness on firm performance.  
 
From anecdotal evidence of the restriction on multiple directorships, it appears that 
due to the costs associated with having busy directors on a board, firms are willing to 
forgo the benefits of the expertise of reputed busy outside directors. In this paper, I show 
that CIDs can provide a channel through which firms can accommodate busy reputed 
outside directors on a board and at the same time mitigate the negative busyness effects. 
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TABLE 1: Number of Busy Boards and CID Boards in Sample   
This table presents the matrix of the number of CID Board and Busy Board in the sample. The sample 
consists of 43,705 firm-year observations for 5747 companies between 1997 and 2013. Panel A presents 
the number of firm-years in the intersection of the Busy Board and CID Board matrix. Panel B presents the 
number of firms in the intersection of the Busy Board and CID Board matrix. Busy Board refers to the firms 
where a majority of the outside directors hold three or more directorships. Non-Busy Board refers to the 
firms where a majority of the outside directors hold fewer than three directorships. CID Board refers to the 
firms where at least one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Non-
CID Board refers to the firms where either no non-CEO inside director is included on the board or no non-
CEO inside director holds directorships at an unaffiliated firm. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Firm-Years 
 Busy Board Non-Busy Board Total 
CID Board 283 2337 2620 
NON-CID Board 2461 38624 41085 
Total 2744 40961 43705 
 
Panel B: Number of Firms 
 Busy Board Non-Busy Board Total 
CID Board 147 832 885 
NON-CID Board 1117 5534 5685 
Total 1177 5595 5747 
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TABLE 2: Distribution of Directorships Held    
This table reports the distribution of directors based on the number of directorships held by the directors in 
the sample between 1997 and 2003. The directorship counts and the number of directors reported on the 
table includes both inside and outside directors.  
 
 
 
Total Directorships Directors % of Directors 
1 248,289 80.87 
2 39,338 12.81 
3 13,191 4.3 
4 4,205 1.37 
5 1,368 0.45 
6 406 0.13 
7 108 0.04 
8 72 0.02 
9 20 0.01 
10 10 0 
Total 357,007 100.00 
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TABLE 3: Annual Distribution of Outside Directors   
This table presents annual distribution of the number of directors, outside directors and busy outside 
directors in the sample between 1997 and 2013. Number of directors in a year refers to the number of 
unique directors in the sample for that particular year. Outside directors are directors on the board who do 
not have any material relationship with the company or its affiliates (i.e., independent directors). Busy 
directors refers to the outside directors who hold three or more directorships.  
 
Year Directors Outside 
Directors 
Busy 
Outside 
Directors 
% of Busy 
Directors (Busy 
Outside 
Directors/Directors 
% of Busy Directors 
(Busy Outside 
Directors/Outside 
Directors 
1997 11,140 6,577       845 7.59% 12.85% 
1998 12,262 7,222 1,187 9.68% 16.44% 
1999 12,325 7,296 1,381 11.20% 18.93% 
2000 15,106 8,688 1,389 9.20% 15.99% 
2001 15,673 9,369 1,422 9.07% 15.18% 
2002 15,079 9,506 1,336 8.86% 14.05% 
2003 23,981 15,779 2,134 8.90% 13.52% 
2004 26,583 18,262 2,527 9.51% 13.84% 
2005 27,808 19,502 2,678 9.63% 13.73% 
2006 27,775 19,677 2,533 9.12% 12.87% 
2007 27,017 19,776 2,702 10.00% 13.66% 
2008 25,502 18,895 2,373 9.31% 12.56% 
2009 24,219 18,091 2,149 8.87% 11.88% 
2010 23,958 18,053 2,099 8.76% 11.63% 
2011 23,769 17,899 2,006 8.44% 11.21% 
2012 23,684 17,888 1,929 8.14% 10.78% 
2013 21,350 16,014 1,755 8.22% 10.96% 
 
  
 97 
 
TABLE 4: Annual Distribution of Inside Directors  
This table presents annual distribution of the number of directors, inside directors and certified inside 
directors (CIDs) in the sample between 1997 and 2013. Number of directors in a year refers to the number 
of unique directors in the sample for that particular year. Inside directors are executives of the company 
who hold directorship on the company’s board. Certified inside directors (CIDs) refers to the non-CEO inside 
directors who also hold a directorship at an unaffiliated firm.  
 
 
Year No. of 
Directors 
No. of 
Inside 
Directors 
% of 
Inside 
Directors 
Number of 
CIDs 
% of CIDs 
among Insider 
Directors 
1997 11,140 2,650 23.79% 170 6.42% 
1998 12,262 2,890 23.57% 191 6.61% 
1999 12,325 2,858 23.19% 179 6.26% 
2000 15,106 3,539 23.43% 169 4.78% 
2001 15,673 3,556 22.69% 163 4.58% 
2002 15,079 3,192 21.17% 129 4.04% 
2003 23,981 5,101 21.27% 198 3.88% 
2004 26,583 5,383 20.25% 209 3.88% 
2005 27,808 5,400 19.42% 188 3.48% 
2006 27,775 5,246 18.89% 207 3.95% 
2007 27,017 5,105 18.90% 170 3.33% 
2008 25,502 4,646 18.22% 162 3.49% 
2009 24,219 4,338 17.91% 152 3.50% 
2010 23,958 4,212 17.58% 121 2.87% 
2011 23,769 4,169 17.54% 127 3.05% 
2012 23,684 4,130 17.44% 134 3.24% 
2013 21,350 3,610 16.91% 122 3.38% 
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TABLE 5: Annual Distribution of Busy Board and CID Board    
This table presents annual distribution of the number of firms, Busy Boards and CID Boards in the sample 
between 1997 and 2013. Busy Board refers to the firms where a majority of the outside directors hold three 
or more total directorships. CID Board refers to the firms where at least one of the non-CEO inside directors 
holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm.  
 
 
 
Year Firms Busy Board % of Firm with 
Busy Board 
CID Board % of Firm with 
CID Board 
1997 1204 50 4.15% 155 12.87% 
1998 1347 106 7.87% 169 12.55% 
1999 1354 127 9.38% 160 11.82% 
2000 1753 140 7.99% 154 8.78% 
2001 1841 136 7.39% 155 8.42% 
2002 1754 94 5.36% 121 6.90% 
2003 3011 157 5.21% 188 6.24% 
2004 3353 192 5.73% 196 5.85% 
2005 3519 210 5.97% 178 5.06% 
2006 3495 209 5.98% 195 5.58% 
2007 3431 243 7.08% 162 4.72% 
2008 3191 180 5.64% 155 4.86% 
2009 3025 152 5.02% 146 4.83% 
2010 2973 158 5.31% 116 3.90% 
2011 2940 170 5.78% 122 4.15% 
2012 2917 165 5.69% 131 4.49% 
2013 2597 147 5.67% 117 4.51% 
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TABLE 6: Annual Distribution of Busy Boards with Certified Inside Director (CID)  
This table presents the annual distribution of Busy Boards where at least one certified inside director (CID) 
is present on the board. (i.e., Firms in BUSYBOARD and CIDBOARD Interaction). Busy Board refers to the 
firms where a majority of the outside directors hold three or more directorships. Certified inside directors 
(CIDs) refers to the non-CEO inside directors who also hold a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board 
refers to the firms where at least one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated 
firm. 
 
 
Year Firms 
1997 12 
1998 25 
1999 22 
2000 19 
2001 17 
2002 14 
2003 19 
2004 20 
2005 22 
2006 16 
2007 21 
2008 12 
2009 12 
2010 11 
2011 12 
2012 16 
2013 13 
Total 283 
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TABLE 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample    
This table presents the descriptive statistics of board and firm characteristics for the full sample between 
1997 and 2013. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between 
the book value of the firm’s assets and equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. ROA is 
calculated as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the 
decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided 
by the average of the beginning and year end book value of total assets.  Total assets and total sales are 
those reported by Compustat at year-end. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income 
scaled by total assets. Directorships by CEO is calculated as the natural log of the number of directorship 
held by the CEO. Ownership by CEO is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. 
Ownership by Directors is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the directors combined 
(excluding the CEO). Board Size is measured as the natural log of the number of total directors on the firm’s 
board. Board Composition is measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board and it is 
calculated as number of outside directors scaled by board size. Directors holding three or more 
directorships are considered busy. Busy Board is an indicator variable which equals one when a majority 
(50% or more) of outside directors are busy and zero otherwise. Percentage of Busy Directors measures 
the percentage of outside directors who are busy. Firm Age is calculated as the number of years since a 
firm first included in CRSP database. Depreciation-to-Sales ratio is used as a proxy for Growth 
Opportunities and this ratio is calculated as Depreciation expense scaled by net sales. Number of Business 
Segments measures the number of business segments based on COMPUSTAT segments data. 
 
 
Variables N Mean Median STD 
Tobin’s Q       43,364 2.08 1.66 1.39 
Return on Assets 43,483 0.06 0.1 0.19 
Sale/Assets Ratio 43,634 1.02 0.89 0.72 
Operating Margin Ratio 43,584 0.07 0.11 0.18 
Total Assets 43,637 2,589.62 530.17 5,389.83 
Sales 43,652 2,253.55 481.31 4,589.78 
Directors Ownership  % 43,188 4.36 2.09 7.49 
CEO Ownership  % 43,173 3.01 1.59 4.92 
Board Size 43,705 8.16 8 2.31 
Independent Directors % 43,705 69.34 71.43 16.47 
Busy Director % 43,705 13.49 0 17.08 
Busy Board 43,705 0.06 0 0.24 
Firm Age 43,705 17.55 12 16.61 
Business Segments 43,705 2.16 1 1.54 
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TABLE 8: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with and without Busy Board Subsamples    
This table presents the descriptive statistics of board and firm characteristics for the firms with and without 
Busy Board subsamples between 1997 and 2013. Firms with a Busy Board refer to the firms where a 
majority of outside directors are busy (i.e., hold three or more directorships). Firms without a Busy Board 
refer to the firms where a majority of outside directors are not busy. Descriptive statistics for firms with a 
Busy Board are presented in Panel A. Descriptive statistics for firms without a Busy Board are presented 
in Panel B. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the 
book value of the firm’s assets and equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. ROA is calculated 
as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in 
inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average 
of the beginning and year end book value of total assets.  Total assets and total sales are those reported 
by Compustat at year-end. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income standardized by total 
assets. Directorships by CEO is calculated as the natural log of the number of directorship held by the CEO. 
Ownership by CEO is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. Ownership by 
Directors is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the directors combined (excluding the 
CEO). Board Size is measured as the natural log of the number of total directors on the firm’s board. Board 
Composition is measured by the percentage of outside director on the board and it is calculated as number 
of outside directors scaled by board size. Directors holding three or more directorships are considered busy. 
Busy Board is an indicator variable which equals one when a majority (50% or more) of outside directors 
are busy and zero otherwise. Percentage of Busy Directors measures the percentage of outside directors 
who are busy. Firm Age is calculated as the number of years since a firm first included in CRSP database. 
Depreciation-to-Sales ratio is used as a proxy for Growth Opportunities and this ratio is calculated as 
Depreciation expense scaled by net sales. Number of Business Segments measures the number of 
business segments based on COMPUSTAT segments data. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test of the difference in means. 
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Variables N Mean Median STD 
Panel A: Firms with a Busy Board 
Tobin’s Q       2,722 2.33*** 1.81 1.60 
Return on Assets 2,739 0.04*** 0.10 0.21 
Sale/Assets Ratio 2,736 0.90*** 0.79 0.66 
Operating Margin Ratio 2,735 0.04*** 0.10 0.20 
Total Assets 2,737 4,318.02*** 975.50 7,255.57 
Sales 2,738 3,651.25*** 763.52 6,138.05 
Directors Ownership  % 2,720 4.14 1.54 8.37 
CEO Ownership  % 2,724 2.91 1.15 5.53 
Board Size 2,744 8.37*** 8.00 2.54 
Independent Directors % 2,744 67.41*** 71.43 18.13 
Busy Director % 2,744 56.74 55.56 7.13 
Busy Board 2,744 1.00*** 1.00 0.00 
Firm Age 2,744 15.08*** 8.00 18.85 
Business Segments 2,744 2.16 1.00 1.65 
Panel B: Firms without a Busy Board 
Tobin’s Q       40,642 2.06*** 1.66 1.37 
Return on Assets 40,744 0.07*** 0.11 0.19 
Sale/Assets Ratio 40,898 1.03*** 0.89 0.72 
Operating Margin Ratio 40,849 0.07*** 0.11 0.18 
Total Assets 40,900 2,473.96*** 514.57 5,221.06 
Sales 40,914 2,160.01*** 469.51 4,451.52 
Directors Ownership  % 40,468 4.37 2.14 7.43 
CEO Ownership  % 40,449 3.01 1.63 4.88 
Board Size 40,961 8.15*** 8.00 2.29 
Independent Directors % 40,961 69.47*** 71.43 16.34 
Busy Director % 40,961 10.59*** 0.00 13.20 
Busy Board 40,961 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Age 40,961 17.72*** 13.00 16.44 
Business Segments 40,961 2.16 1.00 1.53 
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TABLE 9: Descriptive Statistics for Firms with and without CID Board Subsamples    
This table presents the descriptive statistics of board and firm characteristics for the firms with and without 
CID Board subsamples between 1997 and 2013. Firms with a CID Board refer to the firms where at least 
one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Firms without a CID Board 
refer to the firms where no non-CEO inside directors is present on the board or none of the non-CEO inside 
directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Descriptive statistics for firms with a CID Board are 
presented in Panel A. Descriptive statistics for firms without a CID Board are presented in Panel B. Tobin’s 
Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book value of the 
firm’s assets and equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. ROA is calculated as the sum of 
operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the 
increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the 
beginning and year end book value of total assets.  Total assets and total sales are those reported by 
Compustat at year-end. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income standardized by total 
assets. Directorships by CEO is calculated as the natural log of the number of directorship held by the CEO. 
Ownership by CEO is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. Ownership by 
Directors is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the directors combined (excluding the 
CEO). Board Size is measured as the natural log of the number of total directors on the firm’s board. Board 
Composition is measured by the percentage of outside director on the board and it is calculated as number 
of outside directors scaled by board size. Directors holding three or more directorships are considered busy. 
Busy Board is an indicator variable which equals one when a majority (50% or more) of outside directors 
are busy and zero otherwise. Percentage of Busy Directors measures the percentage of outside directors 
who are busy. Firm Age is calculated as the number of years since a firm first included in CRSP database. 
Depreciation-to-Sales ratio is used as a proxy for Growth Opportunities and this ratio is calculated as 
Depreciation expense scaled by net sales. Number of Business Segments measures the number of 
business segments based on COMPUSTAT segments data. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test of the difference in means. 
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Variables N Mean Median STD 
Panel A: Firms with a CID Board 
Tobin’s Q       2,609 2.13** 1.67 1.46 
Return on Assets 2,615 0.11*** 0.13 0.15 
Sale/Assets Ratio 2,618 1.05* 0.92 0.71 
Operating Margin Ratio 2,618 0.11*** 0.13 0.14 
Total Assets 2,619 6,150.71*** 2,274.30 8,054.90 
Sales 2,620 5,378.32*** 1,996.43 6,881.55 
Directors Ownership  % 2,605 4.92*** 1.88 8.57 
CEO Ownership  % 2,603 2.82* 0.75 5.79 
Board Size 2,620 10.14*** 10.00 2.72 
Independent Directors % 2,620 63.68*** 66.67 14.20 
Busy Director % 2,620 18.77*** 14.84 19.08 
Busy Board 2,620 0.11*** 0.00 0.31 
Firm Age 2,620 23.81*** 17.00 19.96 
Business Segments 2,620 2.63*** 2.00 1.89 
Panel B: Firms without a CID Board 
Tobin’s Q       40,755 2.07** 1.66 1.39 
Return on Assets 40,868 0.06*** 0.10 0.19 
Sale/Assets Ratio 41,016 1.02* 0.88 0.72 
Operating Margin Ratio 40,966 0.06*** 0.11 0.19 
Total Assets 41,018 2,362.24*** 487.34 5,089.46 
Sales 41,032 2,054.02*** 442.38 4,327.27 
Directors Ownership  % 40,583 4.32*** 2.13 7.42 
CEO Ownership  % 40,570 3.02* 1.66 4.86 
Board Size 41,085 8.04*** 8.00 2.22 
Independent Directors % 41,085 69.70*** 71.43 16.53 
Busy Director % 41,085 13.15*** 0.00 16.89 
Busy Board 41,085 0.06*** 0.00 0.24 
Firm Age 41,085 17.16*** 12.00 16.29 
Business Segments 41,085 2.13*** 1.00 1.51 
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TABLE 10: Descriptive Statistics for Busy-CID Board and Busy-NOCID Board Subsamples    
This table presents the descriptive statistics of board and firm characteristics for the Busy-CID Board and 
Busy-NOCID Board Subsamples between 1997 and 2013. Firms with Busy-CID Board refer to the firms 
where a majority of the outside directors are busy (i.e., hold three or more directorships) and at least one 
of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Firms with Busy-NOCID Board 
refers to the firms where a majority of the outside directors are busy, but a certified inside director (CID) is 
not present on the board. Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold a 
directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Descriptive statistics for firms with Busy-CID Board are presented in 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for firms with Busy-NOCID Board are presented in Panel B. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s 
assets and equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. ROA is calculated as the sum of operating 
income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in 
current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the beginning and 
year end book value of total assets.  Total assets and total sales are those reported by Compustat at year-
end. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income standardized by total assets. Directorships 
by CEO is calculated as the natural log of the number of directorship held by the CEO. Ownership by CEO 
is measured as the percentage of common shares held by the CEO. Ownership by Directors is measured 
as the percentage of common shares held by the directors combined (excluding the CEO). Board Size is 
measured as the natural log of the number of total directors on the firm’s board. Board Composition is 
measured by the percentage of outside director on the board and it is calculated as number of outside 
directors scaled by board size. Directors holding three or more directorships are considered busy. Busy 
Board is an indicator variable which equals one when a majority (50% or more) of outside directors are 
busy and zero otherwise. Percentage of Busy Directors measures the percentage of outside directors who 
are busy. Firm Age is calculated as the number of years since a firm first included in CRSP database. 
Depreciation-to-Sales ratio is used as a proxy for Growth Opportunities and this ratio is calculated as 
Depreciation expense scaled by net sales. Number of Business Segments measures the number of 
business segments based on COMPUSTAT segments data. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed t-test of the difference in means. 
  
 106 
 
 
Variables N Mean Median STD 
Panel A: Firms with Busy-CID Board 
Tobin’s Q       282 2.44*** 1.89 1.71 
Return on Assets 283 0.12*** 0.14 0.16 
Sale/Assets Ratio 283 1.00** 0.92 0.65 
Operating Margin Ratio 283 0.12*** 0.13 0.15 
Total Assets 283 8,527.66*** 3,352.79 9,490.37 
Sales 283 7,463.40*** 3,208.87 7,933.04 
Directors Ownership  % 283 5.16** 1.53 9.64 
CEO Ownership  % 283 3.65** 0.69 7.65 
Board Size 283 10.33*** 10.00 2.84 
Independent Directors % 283 59.15*** 62.50 14.88 
Busy Director % 283 57.56** 57.14 7.05 
Busy Board 283 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Firm Age 283 23.13*** 16.00 21.43 
Business Segments 283 3.04*** 3.00 2.23 
Panel B: Firms with Busy-NOCID Board 
Tobin’s Q       2,440 2.31*** 1.80 1.59 
Return on Assets 2,456 0.03*** 0.09 0.21 
Sale/Assets Ratio 2,453 0.89** 0.77 0.67 
Operating Margin Ratio 2,452 0.04*** 0.10 0.21 
Total Assets 2,454 3,832.55*** 807.28 6,788.39 
Sales 2,455 3,211.81*** 683.23 5,737.54 
Directors Ownership  % 2,437 4.02** 1.54 8.21 
CEO Ownership  % 2,441 2.83** 1.22 5.22 
Board Size 2,461 8.15*** 8.00 2.41 
Independent Directors % 2,461 68.36*** 71.43 18.23 
Busy Director % 2,461 56.64** 55.56 7.13 
Busy Board 2,461 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Firm Age 2,461 14.15*** 7.00 18.31 
Business Segments 2,461 2.06*** 1.00 1.54 
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TABLE 11: Effect of Outside Directors’ Busyness on Firm Performance  
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of firm performance and busy outside directors using 
fixed effect regression. Firm performance is measured using Tobin’s Q and ROA. Models (1) and (2) use 
Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and Models (3) and (4) use ROA as the dependent variable. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the 
book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the 
book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. ROA is calculated as the sum of operating income 
before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current 
liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the beginning and year end 
book value of total assets. The regressions use Busy Board Indicator and Busy Director Percent as the 
busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the 
outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of 
outside directors that hold three or more directorships. The definitions of all other variables are self-
explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and 
year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values 
are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** 
and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q ROA ROA 
Busy Board Indicator -0.041***  -0.033**  
 (0.001)  (0.030)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.151***  -0.110*** 
  (0.006)  (0.004) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.114 -0.117 -0.107*** -0.137*** 
 (0.466) (0.384) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.036** 0.050*** 0.032 0.033 
 (0.032) (0.005) (0.297) (0.186) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.114*** 0.104*** 0.100** 0.120** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.039) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.004** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.043) (0.014) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.009 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.362) (0.360) 
     
Board Size Log -0.372*** -0.374*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.140*** 0.120*** 0.091** 0.110** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) 
     
Return on Assets 1.783*** 1.783***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
     
Return on Sales   2.016*** 2.016*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.435*** 0.335*** 0.454*** 0.344*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.061) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.073*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Business Segments -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 43034 43034 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 12: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) in 
mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance. Busyness measures are 
interacted with CID Board Indicator. Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold 
directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director is 
present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) 
and Busy Director Percent (Model (2) and (4)) as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an 
indicator variable which equals one if 50% or more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more 
directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more 
directorships. Firm performance, the dependent variable, is measured using Tobin’s Q (Models (1) and (2)) 
and ROA (Models (3) and (4)).  Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end 
of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. ROA is 
calculated as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the 
decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets, divided 
by the average of the beginning and year end book value of total assets. The definitions of all other variables 
are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry 
and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-
values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. 
*, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 110 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q ROA ROA 
Busy Board Indicator -0.053***  -0.054***  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction 0.071***  0.077***  
 (0.001)  (0.000)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.041**  -0.040** 
  (0.016)  (0.017) 
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction  0.075***  0.070*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
     
CID Board Indicator 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.114 -0.115 -0.107* -0.107* 
 (0.475) (0.422) (0.071) (0.069) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.035** 0.050*** 0.042 0.043 
 (0.039) (0.005) (0.293) (0.189) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.003** -0.003** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.002) (0.007) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.367) (0.367) 
     
Board Size Log -0.381*** -0.384*** -0.227*** -0.231*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.090** 0.100*** 
 (0.00) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) 
     
Return on Assets 1.782*** 1.782***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
     
Return on Sales   1.916*** 2.016*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.436*** 0.435*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.000* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.060) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 12 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q ROA ROA 
     
Business Segments -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 43034 43034 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 13: Impact of Certified Inside Director (CID) in High Monitoring Cost Firms 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) on 
directors’ busyness effect in high monitoring cost firms.  Monitoring cost is measured by a factor score from 
a principal-component analysis using stock return volatility, R&D Intensity, proportion of inside ownership 
and the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. High (Low) Monitoring Cost Indicator equals one if a firm 
is in the top (bottom) quartile of the monitoring cost factor score and zero otherwise. The Indicator variable 
Busy-CID equals one if majority of the outside directors are busy (i.e., hold three or more directorships) and 
at least one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm (i.e. firm has both 
Busy Board and CID Board). The Indicator variable Busy-NOCID equals one if a majority of the outside 
directors are busy, but a certified inside director (CID) is not present on the board (i.e., firm has a Busy 
Board, but does not have a CID Board). Busy Board refers to the firms where a majority of the outside 
directors hold three or more total directorships. CID Board refers to the firms where at least one of the non-
CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. Tobin’s Q is the dependent variables it is 
calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the 
book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the 
book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. The definitions of all other variables are self-
explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and 
year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values 
are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** 
and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy-CID & High Monitoring Cost 0.058*** 0.081*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Busy-CID & Low Monitoring Cost 0.013** 0.033** 
 (0.049) (0.017) 
   
Busy-NOCID & High Monitoring Cost  -0.147*** 
  (0.010) 
   
Busy-NOCID & Low Monitoring Cost  -0.126 
  (0.117) 
   
Busy Board with CID (Busy-CID) 0.028** 0.049** 
 (0.033) (0.020) 
   
Busy Board without CID (Busy-NOCID) -0.098** -0.109** 
 (0.024) (0.032) 
   
High Monitoring Cost -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.665) (0.447) 
   
Low Monitoring Cost 0.006 0.002 
 (0.752) (0.905) 
   
CEO Directorship Log -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.449) (0.418) 
   
Industry Director Indicator 0.036** 0.036** 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
   
Director Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Board Interlock Indicator -0.064** -0.064** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
   
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Board Size Log -0.373*** -0.372*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Independent Director Percent 0.091 0.090 
 (0.401) (0.394) 
   
Return on Assets 0.782*** 0.782*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 13 Continued   
 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Firm Size 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Firm Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Growth Opportunities 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Business Segments -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
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TABLE 14: Impact of Certified Inside Director (CID) in High Complexity Firms 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) on 
directors’ busyness effect in high complexity firms.  Firm complexity is measured by a factor score from a 
principal-component analysis using firm size, firm age, leverage and number of business segments. High 
(Low) Complexity Indicator equals one if a firm is in the top (bottom) quartile of the complexity factor score, 
and zero otherwise. The Indicator variable Busy-CID equals one if a majority of the outside directors are 
busy (i.e., hold three or more directorships) and at least one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a 
directorship at an unaffiliated firm (i.e. firm has both Busy Board and CID Board). The Indicator variable 
Busy-NOCID equals one if majority of the outside directors are busy, but a certified inside director (CID) is 
not present on the board (i.e., firm has a Busy Board, but does not have a CID Board). Busy Board refers 
to the firms where a majority of the outside directors hold three or more total directorships. CID Board refers 
to the firms where at least one of the non-CEO inside directors holds a directorship at an unaffiliated firm. 
Tobin’s Q is the dependent variables it is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of 
the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. The 
definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A 
(variable definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report 
p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy-CID & High Complexity 0.109*** 0.118*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
   
Busy-CID & Low Complexity 0.096*** 0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
   
Busy-NOCID & High Complexity  -0.107*** 
  (0.003) 
   
Busy-NOCID & Low Complexity  -0.054* 
  (0.058) 
   
Busy Board with CID (Busy-CID) 0.081*** 0.082*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) 
   
Busy Board without CID (Busy-NOCID) -0.010*** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
   
High Complexity -0.057*** -0.063*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) 
   
Low Complexity 0.004 0.001 
 (0.784) (0.966) 
   
CEO Directorship Log -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.420) (0.447) 
   
Industry Director Indicator 0.037** 0.038** 
 (0.028) (0.025) 
   
Director Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Board Interlock Indicator -0.063** -0.063** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
   
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Board Size Log -0.371*** -0.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Independent Director Percent 0.089** 0.082** 
 (0.028) (0.090) 
   
Return on Assets 0.783*** 0.782*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 14 Continued   
 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Firm Size 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Firm Age -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Growth Opportunities 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Business Segments -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
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TABLE 15: Impact of CIDs and Outside Directors’ Busyness on Cash Holding 
 
This table presents the results of fixed effect multivariate analysis of (a) the effect of outside directors’ 
busyness on cash holding (Models (1) and (2))  and (b) the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) on the 
association between cash holdings and outside directors’ busyness (Models (3) and (4)). Certified inside 
directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board 
Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director is present on the board and zero otherwise. The 
regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and (4)) 
as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more 
of the outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the 
percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Dependent Variable is Cash Holdings, 
measured as cash and cash equivalent scaled by total sales. The definitions of all other variables are self-
explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and 
year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values 
are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** 
and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Busy Board Indicator -0.014***  -0.015***  
 (0.006)  (0.003)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.018***  -0.019*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   0.029***  
   (0.006)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    0.033*** 
    (0.008) 
     
CID Board Indicator   0.011** 0.015** 
   (0.025) (0.033) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.136 -0.160 -0.144 -0.150 
 (0.745) (0.701) (0.731) (0.719) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.048 0.012 0.026 0.007 
 (0.689) (0.976) (0.733) (0.986) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 
 (0.369) (0.371) (0.368) (0.391) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.061 -0.036 -0.091 -0.065 
 (0.547) (0.576) (0.515) (0.543) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.010 
 (0.872) (0.868) (0.832) (0.790) 
     
Board Size Log -0.477*** -0.498*** -0.498*** -0.442*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.022** 0.022** 0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Return on Assets 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.546) (0.541) (0.547) (0.519) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Business Segments -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.019 
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Table 15 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash Cash Cash Cash 
 (0.394) (0.387) (0.404) (0.370) 
     
CEO Duality -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.455) (0.421) (0.398) (0.387) 
     
R&D Intensity 3.673*** 3.684*** 3.759*** 3.851*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
CAPEX Intensity 3.989*** 3.989*** 3.997*** 3.973*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Stock Volatility 5.460*** 5.431*** 5.404*** 5.287*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Leverage -1.067*** -1.089*** -1.048*** -1.078*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 
N 43034 43034 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 16: Impact of CIDs and Outside Directors’ on Earning Restatements 
 
This table presents the results of probit regression analysis of (a) the effect of outside directors’ busyness 
on the likelihood of earnings misrepresentation (Models (1) and (2))  and (b) the impact of certified inside 
directors (CIDs) on the association between the likelihood of earnings misrepresentation and outside 
directors’ busyness (Models (3) and (4)). Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who 
hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director 
is present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) 
and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and (4)) as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more 
directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more 
directorships. Dependent variable Restate is an indicator variable for earnings restatement that takes value 
of 1 if the firm issued announcement for earning restatement covering any quarter of the year. The 
definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A 
(variable definitions). I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at 
the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Restate Restate Restate Restate 
     
Busy Board Indicator 0.055***  0.053***  
 (0.006)  (0.003)  
     
Busy Director Percent  0.042***  0.042*** 
  (0.007)  (0.004) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   -0.055**  
   (0.039)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    -0.050** 
    (0.018) 
     
CID Board Indicator   -0.117** -0.116** 
   (0.049) (0.047) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.032 -0.036 -0.032 -0.037 
 (0.465) (0.404) (0.459) (0.402) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.024 0.004 0.024 0.003 
 (0.513) (0.925) (0.514) (0.934) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.385) (0.387) (0.384) (0.388) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.146** -0.142** -0.146** -0.142** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.309) (0.319) (0.309) (0.320) 
     
Board Size Log -0.086 -0.080 -0.085 -0.080 
 (0.164) (0.194) (0.169) (0.199) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.057) (0.076) (0.056) (0.076) 
     
Market-to-Book 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (0.227) (0.226) (0.230) (0.226) 
     
Firm Size 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Operating CF -0.194** -0.201** -0.194** -0.201** 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.039) (0.032) 
     
CEO Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.669) (0.632) (0.670) (0.633) 
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Table 16 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Restate Restate Restate Restate 
Post-SOX -0.180*** -0.181*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
R&D Intensity -0.036 -0.026 -0.035 -0.025 
 (0.883) (0.915) (0.885) (0.918) 
N 43034 43034 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects No No No No 
Industry fixed-effects No No No No 
Year fixed-effects No No No No 
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TABLE 17: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect Using Lagged Values 
of Busyness and CID Measures  
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) in 
mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance. All busyness and CID measures 
are lagged by one period to address endogeneity concerns. Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO 
inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a 
certified inside director is present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions use Busy Board 
Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and (4)) as the busyness measures. 
Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the outside directors in 
the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of outside directors 
that hold three or more directorships. Firm performance, the dependent variable, is measured using Tobin’s 
Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference 
between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, 
divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. The definitions of all other variables 
are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry 
and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-
values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. 
*, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator (Lag) -0.033***  -0.029***  
 (0.005)  (0.000)  
     
Busy Director Percent (Lag)  -0.081***  -0.081*** 
  (0.009)  (0.002) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction (Lag)   0.048***  
   (0.004)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction (Lag)    0.101*** 
    (0.005) 
     
CID Board Indicator (Lag)   0.054** 0.044** 
   (0.021) (0.022) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.586) (0.553) (0.601) (0.573) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** -0.067** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Board Size Log -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.338*** -0.338*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.090 0.090 0.081 0.081 
 (0.758) (0.789) (0.847) (0.883) 
     
Return on Assets 0.840*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Business Segments -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 17 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 36831 36831 36831 36831 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 18: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect Using Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) 
 
This table presents results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression of the impact of certified inside 
directors (CIDs) in mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance. The number 
of public companies headquartered within 100 miles radius of the firm and the number of outside directors 
who are over 60 years of age is used as the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression. Certified 
inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID 
Board Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director is present on the board and zero otherwise. 
The regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and 
(4)) as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or 
more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the 
percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Firm performance, the dependent 
variable, is measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the 
end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the 
firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. 
The definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix 
A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report 
p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator -0.065***  -0.074***  
 (0.002)  (0.009)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.035***  -0.053*** 
  (0.000)  (0.006) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   0.084***  
   (0.007)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    0.064*** 
    (0.004) 
     
CID Board Indicator   0.144** 0.159** 
   (0.039) (0.050) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.155*** -0.106*** -0.146** -0.118** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) (0.029) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.084*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.003) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.212) (0.640) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.012 -0.028 -0.023** -0.024** 
 (0.777) (0.431) (0.049) (0.043) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005** 0.006*** 0.012 0.129 
 (0.024) (0.002) (0.291) (0.569) 
     
Board Size Log -0.686*** -0.411*** -0.280*** -0.162*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.074 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.769) (0.545) 
     
Return on Assets 0.742*** 0.789*** 0.620*** 1.159*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) 
     
Firm Size 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.112** 0.139** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.039) 
     
Firm Age -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.025** -0.014** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.036) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.366) (0.988) 
     
Business Segments -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.097*** -0.087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) 
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Table 18 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 43034 43034 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 19: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect Using GMM 
Estimation 
 
This table presents results of the GMM Estimation of the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) in 
mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance. One period lag and two period 
lag of Tobin’s Q and all control variables from the busyness-performance regression is used as instruments. 
Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. 
CID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director is present on the board, and zero 
otherwise. The regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent 
(Models (2) and (4)) as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal 
to one if 50% or more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director 
Percent is the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Firm performance, the 
dependent variable, is measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book 
value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of 
the year. The definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in 
Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression 
models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% 
level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator -0.068***  -0.052***  
 (0.006)  (0.008)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.033***  -0.033** 
  (0.008)  (0.012) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   0.063***  
   (0.008)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    0.042*** 
    (0.005) 
     
CID Board Indicator   0.107** 0.065*** 
   (0.019) (0.018) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.113* -0.116* -0.098* -0.105* 
 (0.067) (0.064) (0.100) (0.091) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.039 0.000 0.031 0.004 
 (0.473) (0.998) (0.572) (0.946) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.078 -0.086 -0.054 -0.067 
 (0.335) (0.287) (0.504) (0.406) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.908) (0.869) (0.985) (0.875) 
     
Board Size Log -0.160 -0.188 -0.110 -0.133 
 (0.266) (0.195) (0.439) (0.354) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.331) (0.275) (0.332) (0.290) 
     
Return on Assets 0.161 0.159 0.159 0.151 
 (0.146) (0.153) (0.151) (0.172) 
     
Firm Size 0.360*** 0.381*** 0.355*** 0.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.844) (0.857) (0.831) (0.842) 
     
Business Segments -0.078** -0.077** -0.067* -0.067* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.060) (0.061) 
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Table 19 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Tobin’s Q 1YR Lag 0.343*** 0.348*** 0.333*** 0.341*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Tobin’s Q 2YR Lag 0.761*** 0.773*** 0.750*** 0.761*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 32333 32333 32333 32333 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 20: Impact of CIDs and Outside Directors’ Busyness on Market Value of Cash 
 
This table presents the results of fixed effect multivariate analysis of the impact of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) on the association between market value of cash and outside directors’ busyness. The regression 
is estimated using Fama-MacBeth methodology, where cross sectional regressions are estimated for every 
year. The reported coefficients and standard errors are the average of the cross-sectional regression 
coefficients and standard errors. Certified inside directors (CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold 
directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a certified inside director is 
present on the board, and zero otherwise. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one 
if 50% or more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. The Indicator variable 
Busy-CID equals one if a firm has both Busy Board and CID Board, and zero otherwise. The Indicator 
variable Busy-NOCID equals one if a firm has a Busy Board, but does not have a CID Board, and zero 
otherwise. The Indicator variable NOBUSY-CID equals one if a firm has a CID Board but does not have a 
Busy Board, and zero otherwise.  Dependent Variable is Market Capitalization (market value of the firm), 
which is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of short-term debt and 
long-term debt. The definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text 
and in Appendix A (variable definitions). I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical 
significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) 
 Market Cap 
BUSY-CID & Cash Interaction 1.016*** 
 (0.008) 
  
BUSY-NOCID & Cash Interaction -0.857*** 
 (0.001) 
  
NOBUSY-CID & Cash Interaction 1.146*** 
 (0.006) 
  
Busy Board with CID 0.017*** 
 (0.009) 
  
Busy Board without CID -0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
  
Non-Busy Board with CID 0.004** 
 (0.017) 
  
Cash holding level at t 1.274*** 
 (0.004) 
  
Earnings level at t 8.265** 
 (0.039) 
  
Earnings change from t-1 to t -10.141 
 (0.406) 
  
Earnings change from t to t+1 5.089*** 
 (0.008) 
  
R&D Expense level at t 10.666*** 
 (0.001) 
  
R&D Expense change from t-1 to t -4.563 
 (0.338) 
  
R&D Expense change from t to t+1 2.967** 
 (0.018) 
  
Interest Expense level at t -6.758** 
 (0.026) 
  
Interest Expense change from t-1 to t 4.237 
 (0.327) 
  
Interest Expense change from t to t+1 -3.717** 
 (0.034) 
  
Dividends Payment level at t 7.828*** 
 (0.001) 
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Table 20 Continued  
 (1) 
 Market Cap 
Dividends Payment change from t-1 to t 8.132** 
 (0.049) 
  
Dividends Payment change from t to t+1 5.341 
 (0.275) 
  
Net Assets change from t-1 to t 0.010*** 
 (0.003) 
  
Net Assets change from t to t+1 0.016*** 
 (0.005) 
  
Market Cap change from t to t+1 -0.420*** 
 (0.003) 
N 40697 
Firm fixed-effects No 
Industry fixe-effects No 
Year fixed-effects No 
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TABLE 21: Role of NON-CIDs in Mitigating Busyness Effect 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of the impact of Non-CIDs in mitigating the negative 
effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance. Non-CIDs are non-CEO inside directors who do not 
hold any directorships at an unaffiliated firm. NONCID Board Indicator takes a value of one if a Non-CID is 
present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions use Busy Board Indicator (Model 1) and Busy 
Director Percent (Model 2) as the busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable 
equal to one if 50% or more of the outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy 
Director Percent is the percentage of outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Firm 
performance, the dependent variable, is measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value 
of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets 
and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets 
at the end of the year. The definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main 
text and in Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all 
regression models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at 
the 10% level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator -0.041***  
 (0.003)  
   
Busy Board-NONCID Interaction -0.037  
 (0.358)  
   
Busy Director Percent  -0.031** 
  (0.016) 
   
Percent Busy-NONCID Interaction  -0.021 
  (0.238) 
   
NONCID Board Indicator -0.008 -0.021 
 (0.317) (0.136) 
   
CEO Directorship Log -0.014 -0.017 
 (0.449) (0.365) 
   
Industry Director Indicator 0.037** 0.051*** 
 (0.029) (0.004) 
   
Director Ownership Percent 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Board Interlock Indicator -0.064** -0.062** 
 (0.020) (0.025) 
   
CEO Ownership Percent 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Board Size Log -0.384*** -0.387*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Independent Director Percent 0.090** 0.090** 
 (0.048) (0.045) 
   
Return on Assets 0.783*** 0.783*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Firm Size 0.136*** 0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Firm Age -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Growth Opportunities 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Business Segments -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 21 Continued   
 (1) (2) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 43034 43034 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
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TABLE 22: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect during Pre-SOX 
Period 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of (a) the effect of outside directors’ busyness on 
firm performance during pre-SOX period (Models (1) and (2)) and (b) the impact of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) in mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance during Pre-SOX Period 
(Models (3) and (4)). Pre-SOX period observations refers to the firm-year observations that occur in fiscal 
year prior to 2001. Busyness measures are interacted with CID Board Indicator. Certified inside directors 
(CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator 
takes a value of one if a certified inside director is present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions 
use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and (4)) as the 
busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the 
outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of 
outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Firm performance, the dependent variable, is 
measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the 
year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity 
at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. The definitions 
of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable 
definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values 
in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator -0.055***  -0.074***  
 (0.002)  (0.009)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.061***  -0.063*** 
  (0.008)  (0.004) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   0.106**  
   (0.045)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    0.075** 
    (0.034) 
     
CID Board Indicator   0.111** 0.116** 
   (0.041) (0.042) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.036 -0.035 -0.032 -0.031 
 (0.556) (0.559) (0.592) (0.610) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.053 0.057 0.052 0.056 
 (0.421) (0.396) (0.427) (0.403) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.046) (0.050) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.107 -0.105 -0.107 -0.106 
 (0.142) (0.148) (0.141) (0.144) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.837) (0.835) (0.834) (0.775) 
     
Board Size Log -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.101** -0.100** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.022) (0.023) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.072) (0.079) (0.056) (0.077) 
     
Return on Assets 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.955*** 0.951*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046** 0.046** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.047) 
     
Firm Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.712) (0.706) (0.712) (0.711) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Business Segments -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.210) (0.208) 
     
 141 
 
Table 22 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 5636 5636 5636 5636 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 23: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect during Post-SOX 
Period 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of (a) the effect of outside directors’ busyness on 
firm performance during Post-SOX period (Models (1) and (2)) and (b) the impact of certified inside directors 
(CIDs) in mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance during Post-SOX Period 
(Models (3) and (4)). Post-SOX period observations refers to the firm-year observations that occur in fiscal 
year 2001 or later. Busyness measures are interacted with CID Board Indicator. Certified inside directors 
(CIDs) are non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator 
takes a value of one if a certified inside director is present on the board and zero otherwise. The regressions 
use Busy Board Indicator (Models (1) and (3)) and Busy Director Percent (Models (2) and (4)) as the 
busyness measures. Busy Board Indicator (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the 
outside directors in the board hold three or more directorships. Busy Director Percent is the percentage of 
outside directors that hold three or more directorships. Firm performance, the dependent variable, is 
measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the 
year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity 
at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. The definitions 
of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in Appendix A (variable 
definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression models. I report p-values 
in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Busy Board Indicator -0.032**  -0.034**  
 (0.043)  (0.034)  
     
Busy Director Percent  -0.031**  -0.031** 
  (0.014)  (0.029) 
     
Busy Board-CID Interaction   0.110***  
   (0.001)  
     
Percent Busy-CID Interaction    0.091*** 
    (0.007) 
     
CID Board Indicator   0.152*** 0.160*** 
   (0.001) (0.003) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.958) (0.873) (0.923) (0.832) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.043** 0.053*** 0.042** 0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.510) (0.540) (0.530) (0.561) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
     
Board Size Log -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.292*** -0.295*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
     
Return on Assets 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.074) (0.063) (0.080) (0.068) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Business Segments -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 23 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 37398 37398 37398 37398 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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TABLE 24: Role of Certified Inside Director (CID) in Mitigating Busyness Effect Using Alternate 
Busyness Measures 
 
This table presents the results of multivariate analysis of (a) the effect of outside directors’ busyness on 
firm performance during (Models (1) and (3)) and (b) the impact of certified inside directors (CIDs) in 
mitigating the negative effects of directors’ busyness on firm performance (Models (3) and (4)) using 
alternate busyness measures. The regressions use average Director Focus (Models (1) and (2)) and 
average Director Time Committed (Models (3) and (4)) as the alternate busyness measures. Director focus 
of a director in a particular firm is computed as the fraction of the market capital of the firm relative to the 
total market capitalization of the firms in the director’s directorship portfolio. The average director focus in 
a firm is then calculated as the average of the directors’ focus of all outside directors in a firm. Director time 
committed for each director is computed by multiplying number of directorship with the average director 
time commitment required for a particular year (as reported by National Association of Corporate Directors). 
Average Director Time Committed is then calculated the average of the time committed by all the outside 
directors. Busyness measures are interacted with CID Board Indicator. Certified inside directors (CIDs) are 
non-CEO inside directors who hold directorships at an unaffiliated firm. CID Board Indicator takes a value 
of one if a certified inside director is present on the board, and zero otherwise. Firm performance, the 
dependent variable, is measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of the firm’s 
equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book 
value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of 
the year. The definitions of all other variables are self-explanatory or are described in the main text and in 
Appendix A (variable definitions). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are employed for all regression 
models. I report p-values in parentheses. The p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. *, ** and *** marks statistical significance at the 10% 
level, 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
Director Focus 0.123*** 0.091***   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
     
Director Time Committed    -0.006** -0.018** 
   (0.014) (0.018) 
     
Dir Focus-CID Interaction  0.148***   
  (0.000)   
     
Dir Time-CID Interaction    0.050*** 
    (0.001) 
     
CID Board Indicator  0.036***  0.085** 
  (0.006)  (0.017) 
     
CEO Directorship Log -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.588) (0.594) (0.731) (0.690) 
     
Industry Director Indicator 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Director Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Board Interlock Indicator -0.044 -0.043 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.107) (0.120) (0.562) (0.570) 
     
CEO Ownership Percent 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.161) (0.173) 
     
Board Size Log -0.386*** -0.396*** -0.277*** -0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Independent Director Percent 0.048** 0.035** 0.046** 0.036** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.044) (0.043) 
     
Return on Assets 0.758*** 0.758*** 0.501*** 0.502*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Size 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Firm Age -0.004** -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.333) (0.347) 
     
Growth Opportunities 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Business Segments -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 24 Continued     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q TOBIN'S Q 
N 42948 42948 35541 35541 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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APPENDIX A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Busyness and CID: 
 
Busy Director: Outside directors who holds 3 or more directorships.  
 
Busy Director (%): Percentage of outside directors who are busy; calculated as (Busy outside 
directors/Outside Directors) x 100.  
 
Busy Board: Indicator variable that equals one 50% or more of the outside directors are busy, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
CID: Certified inside directors. Non-CEO Inside directors who hold directorships in unaffiliated firms.  
 
CID Board: Indicator variable that equals one if at least one certified inside director is present on the board, 
and zero otherwise.  
 
BUSY-CID: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm has both Busy Board and CID Board, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
BUSY-NOCID: Indicator variable that equals one a firm has a Busy Board but does not have a CID Board, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
NOBUSY-CID: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm has a CID Board but does not have a Busy Board, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Non-CID: Non-CEO Inside directors who do not hold any directorships in unaffiliated firms. 
 
Non-CID Board: Indicator variable that equals one if non-CEO inside directors are present on the board 
but none of them are certified inside directors, and zero otherwise. 
 
Board Characteristics: 
 
Board Size: Natural log of the number of total directors on the board.  
 
Independent Directors (%): Percentage of outside directors on the board; calculated as the number of 
outside directors scaled by the board size. 
 
Industry Director: Indicator variable that equals one if there exists at least one outside director on the 
board who holds at least 50% of his/her directorships in the same Fama-French 48 Industry Class, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Board Interlock: Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO sits on the board of any outside 
director of the firm, and zero otherwise.  
 
CEO Age: Age of the CEO. 
 
CEO Duality: Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the 
board, and zero otherwise. 
 
CEO Directorships: Natural log of the number of directorships held by the CEO.  
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CEO Ownership: Percentage of common shares held by the CEO.  
 
Director Ownership: Percentage of common shares held by all the directors of the board (excluding the 
CEO).  
 
Insider Ownership: Percentage of outstanding common shares held by the directors and officers, 
excluding the CEO. 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
 
Tobin’s Q: The market value of firm’s equity plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s asset 
and the book value of firm’s equity, divided by the book value of firm’s assets. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA): Sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, 
the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets. This 
sum is then scaled by the average of beginning and ending of year book value of total assets. 
 
Return on Sales (ROS): Ratio of operating income to net sales. 
 
Monitoring Cost: Factor score from Principle Component Analysis Stock return volatility, R&D intensity, 
Proportion of inside ownership and Ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
 
High Monitoring Cost: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is in the top quartile of monitoring cost 
factor score, and zero otherwise. 
 
Low Monitoring Cost: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is in the bottom quartile of monitoring 
cost factor score, and zero otherwise. 
 
Complexity: Factor score from Principle Component Analysis using the firm size, firm age, leverage and 
number of business segments. 
 
High Complexity: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is in the top quartile of complexity factor 
score, and zero otherwise. 
 
Low Complexity: Indicator variable that equals one if a firm is in the bottom quartile of complexity factor 
score, and zero otherwise. 
 
Firm Size: Natural log of net sales.  
 
Firm Age: Number of years since a firm was first included in the CRSP database. 
 
Growth Opportunity: Depreciation-to-sales ratio; calculated as depreciation expense scaled by net 
sales.  
 
R&D Intensity: Ratio of R&D Expenditure to total assets. 
 
Capital Expenditure Intensity: Ratio of capital expenditures to sales. 
 
Leverage: Ratio of total debt (short- and long-term debt) to assets. 
 
Operating Margin: Annual operating income standardized by total assets. 
 
Intangible Assets: 1-(Net Property Plant and Equipment/Assets). 
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Operating Cash Flow: Annual cash flow from operations divided by beginning-of-year total assets.  
 
Stock Return Volatility: Standard deviation of the most recent three years of monthly stock returns from 
CRSP. 
 
Market-to-Book: Year-end book value of assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity, 
standardized by book value of total assets.  
 
Market Capitalization: Sum of the market value of equity and the book values of short-term debt and 
long-term debt. 
 
Business Segments: Number of business segments based on COMPUSTAT segments data. 
 
Post-SOX Period: Indicator variable that equals one if the firm-year observations are from fiscal year 
2001 or later, and zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX B: Average Annual Director Time Commitment 
 
 
Year Average Director Time Commitment 
2002 175.00 hours  
2003 180.00 hours  
2004 188.00 hours  
2005 190.00 hours  
2006 210.00 hours  
2007 207.40 hours  
2008 223.10 hours  
2009 222.20 hours  
2010 204.50 hours  
2011 227.50 hours  
2012 218.60 hours  
2013 235.90 hours  
2014 242.10 hours  
 
Data Source: National Association of Corporate Directors 
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APPENDIX C: List of Companies with Busy Board and CID Board 
 
No. GVKEY Name Firm-Years 
1 008901 RPC INC 11 
2 142546 MARINE PRODUCTS CORP 11 
3 009411 SARA LEE 7 
4 001581 AT&T 5 
5 002055 BARRICK GOLD CORP 5 
6 002176 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 5 
7 027928 INTUIT 5 
8 005074 ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS 4 
9 007435 MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING 4 
10 012252 XOMA CORP  4 
11 061839 AMERIGAS PARTNERS  4 
12 062465 TLC VISION CORP  4 
13 062599 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 4 
14 127481 MAXYGEN INC  4 
15 001468 AMERICAN GREETINGS 3 
16 003650 CUMMINS ENGINE 3 
17 005071 GENERAL MILLS 3 
18 005518 HASBRO 3 
19 005680 HOME DEPOT 3 
20 006733 LIMITED 3 
21 007017 USX-MARATHON 3 
22 008479 PEPSICO 3 
23 009225 ROLLINS INC 3 
24 009815 SONOCO PRODUCTS 3 
25 010484 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC  3 
26 011300 WASHINGTON POST 3 
27 013709 ICAHN ENTERPRISES  3 
28 013714 VIACOM 3 
29 023978 UNITED STATES STEEL 3 
30 024810 ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS  3 
31 030137 NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS  3 
32 063907 EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORP 3 
33 143892 JAVELIN PHARMACEUTICALS INC  3 
34 150838 ENBRIDGE ENERGY MANAGEMENT LLC 3 
35 160549 LIBERTY GLOBAL PLC  3 
36 186342 LINKEDIN CORP 3 
37 187039 ZILLOW INC 3 
38 001076 AARON RENTS INC 2 
39 001380 AMERADA HESS 2 
40 001891 AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 2 
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No. GVKEY Name Firm-Years 
41 002942 CANTEL MEDICAL CORP  2 
42 004060 DOW CHEMICAL 2 
43 004371 ENGELHARD 2 
44 004802 FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES 2 
45 004818 FLUOR 2 
46 007251 MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION 2 
47 008762 PROCTER & GAMBLE 2 
48 009325 SL INDUSTRIES INC 2 
49 010156 SUN 2 
50 010576 TIME WARNER 2 
51 010816 USG CORP 2 
52 010984 SPRINT 2 
53 011636 XEROX 2 
54 012141 MICROSOFT 2 
55 012142 ORACLE CORP. 2 
56 012206 DIRECTV  2 
57 013599 CELGENE CORP 2 
58 015133 APOGENT TECHNOLOGIES 2 
59 024008 MEDIMMUNE 2 
60 062290 REVLON INC 2 
61 147988 AECOM TECHNOLOGY CORP 2 
62 160912 DREAMWORKS ANIMATION SKG INC 2 
63 161997 HURON CONSULTING GROUP INC 2 
64 170904 TUMI HOLDINGS INC 2 
65 001045 AMR CORP  1 
66 001078 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 1 
67 001608 AMP 1 
68 002991 CHEVRON 1 
69 003226 COMCAST CORP  1 
70 004321 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO. 1 
71 004367 EVI WEATHERFORD 1 
72 004423 EQUIFAX INC. 1 
73 004611 FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES 1 
74 004839 FORD MOTOR COMPANY 1 
75 004932 METROMEDIA INTERNATIONAL GROUP 1 
76 004988 GANNETT 1 
77 005134 GEORGIA-PACIFIC 1 
78 005581 HELMERICH & PAYNE 1 
79 005597 HERSHEY FOODS 1 
80 006307 SEARS HOLDINGS CORP 1 
81 006502 KROGER 1 
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No. GVKEY Name Firm-Years 
82 006730 ELI LILLY AND CO. 1 
83 007985 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 1 
84 008536 PHELPS DODGE 1 
85 009215 ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 
86 009359 SAFEWAY 1 
87 009899 AT&T INC  1 
88 010443 TENNECO INC  1 
89 010581 TIMKEN 1 
90 010726 TRIBUNE 1 
91 010795 UAL 1 
92 011465 WHIRLPOOL CORP 1 
93 011535 WINN-DIXIE STORES 1 
94 011566 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE, INC. 1 
95 012053 EMC 1 
96 012756 COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES 1 
97 013440 LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS INC 1 
98 013990 WARNACO GROUP [CL A] 1 
99 014285 BENTLEY PHARMACEUTICALS INC  1 
100 015426 MORTON INTERNATIONAL 1 
101 018432 ENVISION HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS INC 1 
102 020570 MDC PARTNERS INC  1 
103 023027 EXPONENT, INC. 1 
104 024474 TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CO  1 
105 024607 MANOR CARE INC 1 
106 024870 NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS 1 
107 025056 AOL TIME WARNER 1 
108 025124 PRAXAIR 1 
109 025331 FRANKLIN COVEY 1 
110 025430 FUELCELL ENERGY INC 1 
111 026061 IAC INTERACTIVECORP  1 
112 028477 FLIR SYSTEMS INC 1 
113 028787 PERFORMANCE FOOD GROUP 1 
114 028924 BARNES & NOBLE, INC. 1 
115 029173 NEWFIELD EXPLORATION 1 
116 061445 INTIMATE BRANDS  -CL A 1 
117 061552 LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL GROUP 1 
118 061870 OPEN TEXT CORP 1 
119 062634 YAHOO INC 1 
120 063800 IMS HEALTH 1 
121 064418 DIAMOND MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY CONSULTANTS 1 
122 064891 RALPH LAUREN CORP  1 
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123 066065 UNITED RENTALS 1 
124 108718 VASOGEN INC  1 
125 112876 ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PARTNERS 1 
126 115245 THERMA-WAVE INC  1 
127 124442 XM SATELLITE RADIO HOLDINGS INC  1 
128 125240 WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT INC  1 
129 125360 SYCAMORE NETWORKS INC  1 
130 130762 INTERSIL 1 
131 136804 CEPHEID 1 
132 137874 SMTC CORPORATION 1 
133 138341 CURIS INC 1 
134 138346 VIRAGE LOGIC CORP 1 
135 143357 ACCENTURE PLC 1 
136 144519 ARAMARK CORP  1 
137 144520 AMN HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC 1 
138 147208 SUNOCO LOGISTICS PARTNERS  1 
139 162906 IHS INC 1 
140 165675 VIACOM INC 1 
141 170297 NORTHERN TIER ENERGY 1 
142 170617 FACEBOOK INC 1 
143 185584 EXAMWORKS GROUP INC 1 
144 187363 GROUPON INC 1 
145 187740 M/A-COM TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS HOLDINGS INC 1 
146 190455 GUIDEWIRE SOFTWARE INC 1 
147 194255 VERASTEM INC 1 
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